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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis describes, compares and assesses the ways in which mass tort claims are addressed 
through United States and Canadian insolvency legislative structures. The thesis begins by 
examining how courts in the United States use the Bankruptcy Code to reorganize companies 
facing extreme financial strain because of mass tort claims.  The areas examined include: the 
consolidation of claims; the automatic stay; the requirement of insolvency; the various tort 
claims that are involved in the mass tort case; the plan; and the confirmation of the plan.   
The thesis then examines how Canadian courts can, and have, used the CCAA to reorganize or 
restructure companies dealing with mass tort claims.  The Canadian Red Cross reorganization is 
used to demonstrate the complexity involved in resolving mass tort cases under Canadian 
insolvency legislation, specifically focusing on the steps that a company must follow to receive 
protection and how the plan can deal with tort claims.  The issue of insolvency is examined as 
Canadian courts require a company to be insolvent in order to receive CCAA protection.  This 
thesis argues that a broader definition of insolvency should be adopted.  The thesis also addresses 
the following: how a stay of proceedings is obtained; the appointment of a monitor to oversee the 
reorganization; the classes; the plan; the sanction (court approval) of the plan; and the types of 
tort claims that are involved in mass tort insolvency reorganizations.   
 
What makes mass tort insolvency cases so unique and difficult are the tort claimants and how 
they fit into the reorganization process. The types of claimants that arise are examined in detail 
and include:  claimants with judgments; claimants who have filed actions but have not obtained 
judgments; claimants whose injuries have manifest themselves but have not yet filed actions; 
contingent claimants, identified “claimants” who have been exposed to the defective or 
dangerous product but have not manifested injuries; and future claimants who have been exposed 
to the defective or dangerous product but who have not been identified at the relevant time.  The 
courts in both countries have included all claims that have manifested injuries before an 
application for reorganization and both countries have found ways to include contingent and 
future claims (unmanifested injuries) by using trusts.   
 
Mass tort case law in both Canada and the United States is examined to show how trusts are 
established by the courts to allow tort claims, including future unidentified claims, to be included 
in the plan.  The outcome of these cases is examined and assessed.  United States case law is 
used to show how Canada can make mass tort insolvency cases more successful in the future by 
avoiding the administrative costs of frivolous claims and setting up “best offer/no negotiation 
schemes” as well as codifying a number of aspects that arise in mass tort cases such as the 
definition of mass torts, future claims representatives and channeling injunctions to also decrease 
time and money on arguing to allow these into the CCAA.  The purpose of the CCAA is to 
provide a company with a fresh start while also providing the creditors of the company with the 
best possible return; mass tort insolvency cases achieve this goal. 
 
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Ronald Cuming, for his continuous support, patience and 
expertise.  I would also like to thank my committee members: John Kleefeld, for his attention to 
detail; Tamara Larre, for seeing the big picture; and my external, Roderick Wood, whose 
comments and critiques assisted in completing this thesis. A special thank you to Martin 
Phillipson, for believing in me when I had all but given up and to Barbara von Tigerstrom for 
believing the final draft was almost there.  As well, I would like to thank the faculty and staff at 
the College of Law and in particular, Lorrie Burlingham, for her assistance on ensuring the 
proper paperwork was always completed. 
 
Most of all, I would like to thank my family.  To my parents, Diamandi and Ioanna, for watching 
my children and regularly feeding all of us in order to give me as much time as possible to 
complete my thesis.  Your unconditional support has not only helped me achieve greater things 
than I could have imagined but has also taught me a great deal on parenting.  To my sister, 
Contelanea, for her continued support throughout this process.  To my friend, Bernie, for her 
encouragement every step of the way.  To my three wonderful children, Kyra, Gregory and 
Matteo, thank you for the endless supply of smiles, hugs and kisses and showing me the 
important things in life.  To my husband, Jason, for your unwavering support and belief in me, 
words cannot express how much I appreciate everything you did to help get me to the end!    
iv 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To my parents, Diamandi and Ioanna. 
To my children, Kyra, Gregory and Matteo. 
To my husband, Jason. 
Thank you!  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER 2:  UNITED STATES MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY ............................................................. 5 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.2 CONSOLIDATING CLAIMS ......................................................................................................................... 5 
2.3 AUTOMATIC STAY .................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.4 REQUIREMENT OF GOOD FAITH ................................................................................................................ 7 
2.5 CLAIMS ..................................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.5.1 Claimants with judgment ............................................................................................................ 10 
2.5.2 Claimants who have filed suit but have not obtained judgment ................................................. 10 
2.5.3 Claimants whose injuries have manifested but have yet to file a suit against the debtor ........... 11 
2.5.4 Contingent Claimants ................................................................................................................. 11 
2.5.5 Future Claims ............................................................................................................................. 16 
2.5.5.1 Future Claims not a “Claim” in Bankruptcy ....................................................................................... 17 
2.5.5.2 Future Claims included in Bankruptcy ............................................................................................... 20 
2.5.5.3 Summary of United States position on Unmanifested Claims ............................................................ 24 
2.5.6 Post-petition Exposure Claims ................................................................................................... 25 
2.5.6.1 Post-Petition but Pre-Confirmation Exposure ..................................................................................... 25 
2.5.6.2 Post-Confirmation Exposure ............................................................................................................... 27 
2.6 CLASSES ................................................................................................................................................. 28 
2.7  THE PLAN .............................................................................................................................................. 28 
2.7.1 Johns Manville Corporation ...................................................................................................... 31 
2.7.2 A.H. Robins Co. .......................................................................................................................... 32 
2.7.3 Dow Corning .............................................................................................................................. 34 
2.8  CONFIRMATION OF PLAN ....................................................................................................................... 35 
2.9   CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER 3:  MASS TORT INSOLVENCY IN CANADA ...................................................................... 40 
3.1   INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 40 
3.2 HISTORY OF THE CCAA ......................................................................................................................... 42 
3.3 INSOLVENCY UNDER THE CCAA ............................................................................................................ 46 
3.3.1 Requirement of Insolvency ............................................................................................................. 46 
3.3.2 Definition of Insolvency in the Context of the CCAA ................................................................. 46 
3.3.2.1 Conservative, BIA-focused definition of “insolvency”....................................................................... 49 
3.3.2.2 Broad definition of insolvency............................................................................................................ 51 
3.3.2.3 Summary of the CCAA Definition of Insolvency ............................................................................... 55 
vi 
 
3.4  STAY OF PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................................................................... 57 
3.5  MONITOR ............................................................................................................................................... 58 
3.6  CLAIMS .................................................................................................................................................. 59 
3.6.1 Claims represented by judgments ............................................................................................... 61 
3.6.2 Claims represented by judgments where the amount of damage has not been determined by a 
court. .......................................................................................................................................... 61 
3.6.3 Claims of identified claimants whose injuries have manifested but who may or may not have 
brought action ............................................................................................................................ 62 
3.6.4 Unknown Claimants ................................................................................................................... 65 
3.6.5 Contingent Claims ...................................................................................................................... 66 
3.6.6 Future Claims ............................................................................................................................. 72 
3.6.7 Post-Petition Claims .................................................................................................................. 74 
3.7  CLASSES ................................................................................................................................................ 75 
3.8  THE PLAN .............................................................................................................................................. 76 
3.9 ACCEPTANCE OF PLAN ........................................................................................................................... 80 
3.10 OUTCOME OF THE RED CROSS REORGANIZATION................................................................................. 83 
CHAPTER 4:  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 88 
CASES CITED ............................................................................................................................................ 98 
WORKS CITED ........................................................................................................................................ 102 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mass tort insolvency is a complex and unique area of law that merges tort law with 
insolvency law.
1
  Mass tort insolvency may involve hundreds or thousands of people having 
claims against a company for a product that a company made, produced or distributed, that 
caused serious injuries or even death to those who came in contact with it.  As a company 
defends an increasing number of tort claims, most of the time it begins to experience extreme 
financial distress.  When this occurs companies in the United States and Canada have turned to 
insolvency legislation to remedy the situation and avoid liquidation. When the Companies 
Creditors Arrangement Act
2
 (hereafter, the “CCAA”) was enacted in Canada in 1933 and the 
United States Bankruptcy Code
3
 (hereafter, the “Bankruptcy Code”) was enacted in the United 
States in 1978, mass tort insolvency did not exist. The purpose of insolvency legislation is to 
provide a “court-supervised process to facilitate the negotiation of compromises and 
arrangements where companies are experiencing financial distress, in order to allow them to 
devise a survival strategy that is acceptable to their creditors.”4 However, Parliament in Canada 
and Congress in the United States had not anticipated insolvency legislation being used to 
resolve mass tort claims, and as such the legislation in both countries does not specifically deal 
with them.  The Bankruptcy Code and the CCAA, however, do contain features that assist 
companies defending mass tort claims to achieve a global resolution of all of their financial 
issues, including such claims.  
The reason insolvency legislation has become the forum of choice for many companies 
facing mass torts claims is that the CCAA and the Bankruptcy Code are both very broad and 
flexible pieces of legislation that allow various claims, procedures and issues to be dealt with in 
one forum.  They also provide a company with the ability to halt all proceedings that exist 
against it, facilitate a global resolution of most of its liabilities, allow it to use its future earning 
capacity to compensate its creditors, and find a way for it to survive.  Tort claimants also turn to 
                                                 
1
 In the United States, “mass tort insolvency” is referred to as “mass tort bankruptcy”.  This is because the term 
“bankruptcy” in the United States refers to both liquidation and reorganization.  However, in Canada the term 
“bankruptcy” is used to refer to liquidation only and the term “insolvency” is used to refer to reorganization.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the term “mass tort insolvency” will be referred to unless the American system is specifically 
being dealt with, and then it will be referred to as “mass tort bankruptcy”. 
2
 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended [hereinafter CCAA]. 
3
 11 U.S.C.  (United States Code, Title 11) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]. 
4
 Janis Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Toronto: Thompson Carswell, 2007) at 1. 
2 
 
the Bankruptcy Code and the CCAA to resolve their claims, as the statutes treat tort claimants 
that are similarly situated equally, regardless of where the claimants reside or if they are creditors 
with knowledge of the system or have means to retain lawyers.  The legislation also allows for a 
pooling of the company’s funds in order to provide the greatest return to the tort claimants as 
possible. 
Mass tort insolvency cases are much more common in the United States than they are in 
Canada.  The United States has dealt with a variety of mass tort cases, including breast implants, 
tobacco litigation and asbestos. In Canada, the most prominent case is Re Canadian Red Cross,
5
 
which dealt with the national distribution of tainted blood. The Red Cross is a non-profit 
corporation that operated the blood donor system and Canada’s national blood system with 
funding from the federal and provincial governments.
6
 The Red Cross provided many services, 
including the supply of blood and blood products, disaster relief, homemaker services, 
international relief and crisis intervention.  It also employed almost 10 thousand people before it 
filed for CCAA protection.  The Red Cross insolvency began in 1998 when $8 billion in tort 
claims were filed against it by thousands of Canadians who became ill or were dying from 
contaminated blood products they received from the Red Cross.  The Red Cross was defending 
itself against over 230 actions and 10 class actions from claimants suffering from Hepatitis C 
(HCV), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (CJD).  Hepatitis C 
is a disease that primarily affects the liver.  It can cause cirrhosis, liver failure, liver cancer and 
gastric esophageal problems. HIV causes progressive failure of a person’s immune system 
allowing life-threatening infections and cancers to thrive. CJD is a type of brain damage disorder 
that is incurable.  The symptoms progress quickly to disability and death within one year after 
they begin. The cost of defending all of the actions against the Red Cross would have led to the 
liquidation of the Red Cross, so it applied for CCAA protection to develop a plan to deal with all 
of its creditors.
7
 
                                                 
5
 Canadian Red Cross Society/ Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, [1998] 
O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4
th
) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), additional reasons at (1998), 
1998 CarswellOnt 3347, 5 C.B.R. (4
th
) 319 (Ont. Gen.Div. [Commercial List]), further additional reasons at (1998), 
1998 CarswellOnt 3345, 5 C.B.R. (4
th
) 321 (Ont. Gen. Div [Commercial List]), leave to appeal refused (1998), 1998 
CarswellOnt 5967, 32 C.B.R. (4
th
) 21 (Ont.C.A.) [hereinafter Red Cross]. 
6
 The Red Cross was incorporated under An Act to incorporate the Canadian Red Cross Society, S.C. 1909, c. 68.  
7
 Ibid. See also: Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).  Note: The Red Cross case also dealt with cross-claims, insurance 
companies and third-party claims, but this goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
3 
 
The Red Cross chose to reorganize because the CCAA allows a company to deal with all 
of its creditors (commercial, trade, tort and employees) in one proceeding and avoid high 
litigation costs.  Generally, this results in more money being available for the claimants.  As 
well, if the reorganization is “successful”,8 the company will continue to run its business and this 
was important to the Red Cross as it carried on vital functions.  Reorganization affects not only 
the debtor and the creditors but also people who depend on the company’s services, those who 
are employed by the company and the communities where the company is located.  
The CCAA and the Bankruptcy Code provide companies facing mass tort claims with a 
structured system to deal with all of the creditors and issues that arise as well as the opportunity 
to prepare a reorganization or restructuring plan that allows a company to survive.  The 
Bankruptcy Code and the CCAA are very different acts, with the Bankruptcy Code being much 
more structured and rule-oriented than the CCAA.  They both, however, follow a general pattern 
and although they are different, Canadian law has treated mass tort cases very similarly to the 
way the United States law does.  For example, they both provide a stay of all proceedings against 
the company, allowing the company time to prepare a plan.  The claims included in the Acts 
must fall within the definition of “claim” as set out in each Act.  Once the types of claims that 
will be allowed in the reorganization are decided, they are placed into classes. When a plan is 
formulated and accepted by the classes and the court, the reorganization is complete.   
In this thesis the author describes, compares and assesses the ways in which mass tort 
claims are addressed through United States and Canadian insolvency legislative structures. 
Chapter 2 contains an examination of how courts in the United States use the Bankruptcy Code 
to reorganize companies facing extreme financial strain because of mass tort claims.  The areas 
examined include: the consolidation of claims; the automatic stay; the requirement of insolvency; 
the various tort claims that are involved in the mass tort case and which will be included in the 
plan; and the confirmation of the plan.  Chapter 3 contains an examination of how Canadian 
courts have used the CCAA to reorganize or restructure companies dealing with mass tort 
claims.  Red Cross is used to demonstrate the complexity involved in resolving mass tort cases 
under insolvency legislation, specifically focusing on the steps that a company must follow to 
receive protection.  The issue of insolvency is examined as Canadian courts require a company to 
                                                 
8
 The company satisfies its creditors and is able to carry on its business with causing the least amount of harm to 
itself, its creditors, its employees, former employees and communities which it carries on its business (See Sklar-
Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 213 (Ont. Gen. Div.).  
4 
 
be insolvent in order to receive CCAA protection.  The courts are divided on what the definition 
of “insolvency” is in the CCAA.  Some courts have adopted a narrow more liquidation focused 
definition while others have adopted a broader definition.  Both approaches are examined.  The 
chapter also addresses the following: how a stay of proceedings is obtained; the appointment of a 
monitor to oversee the reorganization; the types of tort claims that are involved in mass tort 
insolvency reorganizations; the classes; the plan; and the sanction (court approval) of the plan.  
Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with the various  types of claimants in mass tort cases:  
claimants with judgments; claimants who have filed actions but have not obtained judgments; 
claimants whose injuries have manifest themselves but have not yet filed actions; contingent 
claimants, identified “claimants” who have been exposed to the defective or dangerous product 
but have not manifested injuries; and future claimants who have been exposed to the defective or 
dangerous product but who have not been identified at the relevant time.  The courts in both 
countries have found ways to include all these types of claims in the reorganization by using 
trusts.  Mass tort case law in both Canada and the United States, is examined to show how trusts 
are established by the courts to allow tort claims, including future unidentified claims, to be 
included in the plan.  In the end, a company that hopes to survive must find a way to deal with 
current tort claimants, future tort claimants, commercial creditors and all other interested parties 
and develop a plan that is acceptable to the creditors and the court.  Chapter 4 will compare the 
American and Canadian treatment of mass tort reorganizations and provide some suggestions for 
possible changes to assist in the Canadian treatment of mass tort reorganizations in the future. 
 When the United States began dealing with mass torts in bankruptcy over 25 years ago, 
the initial cases were plagued with problems.  The number of claimants and the extent of their 
injuries were poorly estimated and very high administrative costs all contributed to the delay of 
paying out claims and the draining of funds.  But as more mass tort cases entered insolvency 
proceedings, the courts found a more efficient and “successful” way of restructuring that could 
deal with all of the creditors.  In Canada, the first mass tort insolvency case, the Red Cross case, 
was also plagued with problems similar to those encountered in the initial American cases. By 
adopting many aspects of the American approach, Canada may be able to settle mass tort claims 
more efficiently in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2:  UNITED STATES MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Mass tort bankruptcy litigation emerged in American courts over 25 years ago and, as there 
are no statutes that specifically deal with mass tort bankruptcy, many companies chose to 
reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Chapter 11 provides a structured system 
that allows for the management of multiple liabilities in one forum.
9
  When a debtor files for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, “there are readily recognizable parties, procedures, issues, 
and information” 10 that generally lead to “a predictable range of outcomes.”11  Chapter 11 
proceedings allow companies who are solvent to consolidate claims and stay proceedings. Most 
importantly, Chapter 11 contains a broad definition of “claim” that allows for most, if not all, of 
the claims, including future claims against the debtor, to be dealt with in one forum.  Under 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the court has the power to tailor proceedings and outcomes to each 
specific case as it sees fit while taking into account the debtor’s financial situation. Once a plan 
has been agreed upon by creditors, it must be confirmed by the court to ensure fairness.  The 
debtor will then be discharged, subject to it following through with the reorganization plan. The 
Bankruptcy Code allows companies to achieve a global resolution of their financial difficulties 
by dealing with most of the issues that arise in mass tort bankruptcy cases. 
 
 
2.2 Consolidating Claims 
In the United States, bankruptcy, which falls under federal jurisdiction, allows for the 
consolidation of all claims and issues that otherwise would have been dealt with in a number of 
jurisdictions with a variety of procedural and substantive laws.  This consolidation is sanctioned 
by Chapter 28 of the Bankruptcy Code, section 157(b)(5). Essentially, the bankruptcy court has 
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate wherever the claimants may be located and all claimants, 
including the tort claimants, must make their claims to the bankruptcy estate.  Section 157(b)(5) 
                                                 
9
 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 315 (1997).  In 1994 Congress amended the Bankruptcy 
Code to include provisions expressly dealing with asbestos chapter 11 cases.  In 1997, the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission recommended expanded Code treatment of mass tort bankruptcies.  To date, these 
recommendations have not been added to the Bankruptcy Code. 
10
 Francis E. McGovern, “A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute” (2006) 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1809 at 1815. 
11
 Ibid. 
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allows for the centralization of all of the claims against the debtor into the district court where its 
bankruptcy case is pending, allowing one court to have control over all of the issues that arise. 
When a company is faced with mass tort liability, it is not only the tort claimants and the 
company that are affected, but also the company’s “creditors, shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, officers, and directors.”12  Bankruptcy brings all of these claims and 
interests under one forum for a company that does not have sufficient funds in the corporation to 
satisfy all of the tort claims.
13
  For companies that have sufficient funds to satisfy all tort claims, 
class actions are commonly used. In many cases, when a product causes injury to a large number 
of people, class actions are commenced and concluded without a company going into 
bankruptcy.  In some cases if a company is defending a number of tort claims, most of which 
will be class actions, it may run into financial difficulties and turn to bankruptcy legislation to 
deal with all of the claims as well as all other commercial creditors that may exist.
14
 Solvent 
companies facing class actions set aside limited funds to pay out class action claims, whereas in 
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code provides a company with a statutory basis to determine the 
mass claims through a priority system. In many cases the class actions are included as classes in 
the reorganization proceeding.  Centralizing the claims increases the debtor’s chances of 
developing a reasonable plan of reorganization that will work to rehabilitate the debtor, provide a 
fair and non-preferential resolution of claims while eliminating the multiplicity of proceedings 
and the unnecessary use of the debtor’s limited funds while allowing for a more consistent and 
global resolution.
 15
 
 
                                                 
12
 S. Elizabeth Gibson, “A Response to Professor Resnick: Will this Vehicle Pass Inspection?” (2000) 148 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2095 at 2099. 
13
 Ibid.    
14
 Greg M. Zipes, “After Amchem and Ahearn: The Rise of Bankruptcy Over the Class Action Option for Resolving 
Mass Torts on a Nationwide Basis, and the Fall of Finality” (1998) Det. C.L. Rev. 7).  Federal Rule 23 (Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23) sets out the statutory basis for class action law suits by requiring that one or more members of a class may sue 
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable;(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;(3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and(4) the representative parties will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class. Once all four of these prerequisites are met, mass tort class action 
participants must also qualify under one clause of Rule 23(b) in order for a class action to be certified. Mass torts 
usually qualify under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) which states that resolution of individual law suits would substantially impair 
other members to protect their interests, or 23(b)(3) which states that the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  
15
 In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482 at 496-97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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2.3 Automatic Stay 
Once a debtor has filed for bankruptcy, the court orders an automatic stay under section 
362 that halts “all pending and future litigation against the debtor.”16  The automatic stay 
prevents the continuation or commencement of any actions pending in any state or federal courts 
as well as any collection efforts.  All creditors must then file a proof of claim with the 
bankruptcy court.  The Bankruptcy Code also allows a court to expand the automatic stay to 
protect related parties such as officers, shareholders, parent companies and insurers who have not 
filed for bankruptcy but could be parties the claimants may also turn to for compensation.
17
  
The stay provides debtors with relief from the economic pressures that caused their 
bankruptcy filing and gives them the opportunity to create a plan to deal with all of their 
creditors.  The stay also protects the creditors by promoting equal treatment to similarly situated 
creditors.  It prevents the debtor’s assets from becoming depleted by people who file a claim 
before others have had a chance to file their claims.  The automatic stay also assists the 
bankruptcy court in developing a global resolution by allowing all claims to be filed before a 
plan is established.  
 
2.4 Requirement of Good Faith 
The Bankruptcy Code does not require a debtor to be insolvent in order to receive 
bankruptcy protection;
18
 the 1978 Bankruptcy Code removed the requirement.
19
 A solvent debtor 
can file a petition on the condition that it subjects its assets to administration under the 
bankruptcy law.  A case cannot be dismissed on the basis that a debtor is able to pay its debts in 
whole or in part until a plan is proposed.  Although a debtor does not need to be insolvent before 
filing a bankruptcy petition, it must be experiencing “some type of financial distress.”20   
However, there is a court-imposed requirement that the petitioner must be acting in good 
faith.
21
 Section 1112(b) permits conversion or dismissal of a Chapter 11 case “for cause”.  Many 
                                                 
16
 “Mass Tort Litigation and Bankruptcy” 2003 Third Circuit Judicial Conference at 2. 
17
 Bankruptcy courts routinely use their power under Bankruptcy Code, s. 105(a), to extend the automatic stay under 
Bankruptcy Code s. 362(a) to a non-debtor if they foresee an adverse economic consequence that would negatively 
impact the debtor’s ability to reorganize if the relief were not granted.   
18
 Bankruptcy Code, s.109(d). 
19
 Supra note 14 at 50. 
20
 In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108 at 122 (3rd Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Integrated Telecom]. 
21
 In re Panache Dev. Co., 123 B.R. 929, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991). 
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courts have concluded that a lack of good faith is “cause” that would warrant dismissal.22  Courts 
decide on a case-by-case basis if a lack of good faith exists.  Various courts have defined it in 
different ways.  For example, in Integrated Telecom Express Inc.,
23
 the court held that “good 
faith necessarily requires some degree of financial distress on the part of the debtor.”24  In other 
cases, the timing of when the petition was filed, the motive of the debtor, accuracies and 
inaccuracies in the debtor’s petition, whether the reorganization is aimed at frustrating the 
creditors, whether the creditor has an ongoing business to protect, and the reasonable probability 
of a plan being proposed and confirmed, have all been used to determine if good faith exists.
25
  
By removing the insolvency requirement, companies receive protection before they “face a 
financially hopeless situation”26 and their businesses are otherwise damaged and their trade 
credit and capital markets disappear.
27
  American courts have found it futile to begin a 
reorganization process with a company that cannot financially survive it.   
 
2.5 Claims 
One of the most difficult issues in mass tort bankruptcy cases is determining which claims 
will be included in the plan.  A “claim” is defined very broadly in section 101(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Code to mean: 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable 
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
28
 
                                                 
22
 In the Matter of Mountcastle, 68 B.R. 305 ( M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Muralo Co., 301 BR 690 (Bankr. D. N.J., 
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 Cir, 
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Faith Chapter 11 Cases”  60 Tenn L. Rev. 525. 
23
 Supra note 20. 
24
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25
 See In re Harvey Probber, Inc., 44 BR 647 (D. Mass. 1984); In re Block K Associates, 55 BR 630 (D. Col. 1985); 
In re Cooper Properties Liquidating Trust, 61 BR 531 (WD Tenn. 1986). 
26
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27
 Alan N. Resnick, “Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability” (2000)148 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2045 at 2055. 
28
 Bankruptcy Code, section 101(5). 
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When the legislation was originally enacted, the term “claim” included “all legal obligations of 
the debtor no matter how remote or contingent”.29   This broad definition of claim is intended to 
include all claims that exist against the debtor, providing the claimant with the opportunity to 
vote on the plan and receive some part of the distribution of the debtor’s assets.  Including as 
many claims as possible in the reorganization allows the discharge of all of the eligible debts 
and, therefore, increases the chances of a debtor continuing its business and compensating all of 
its creditors.   
Numerous types of claims arise in mass tort cases.  Not only are there standard commercial 
claimants found in bankruptcy cases, such as lending institutions and trade creditors, but there 
may be hundreds, if not thousands, of tort claims with various injuries at various stages.
30
  The 
most complex part of successfully reorganizing mass tort bankruptcy cases is the tort claims. As 
injuries may manifest themselves at various times, the claims may be at various stages when a 
company makes a petition in bankruptcy.  In order to determine whether a claim exists in a 
bankruptcy case, as a general rule, a court will look at whether the claim exists at the date of the 
bankruptcy petition.
31
 
There are six types of personal injury tort claimants that may exist in a bankruptcy case:   
1.  claimants who have incurred injury, have sued the company and have obtained judgment 
against the debtor before the petition was filed;  
2.  claimants whose injuries have manifested and who have filed a suit but have not obtained 
a judgment by the time the petition was filed;  
3.  claimants whose injuries have manifested but have not filed any claim against the debtor 
before the petition was filed;  
4.  claimants who are known to have been exposed to a product but whose injuries have not 
manifested as of the petition date; 
5.  claimants who, unknown to the debtor, have been exposed to the product, and in whom 
injuries have not manifested as of the date of the petition; and  
6.  claimants who were exposed after the date of petition. 
                                                 
29
 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95
th
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess, 309 (1978); S. Rep. No. 989, 95
th
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess. 21 (1978). 
30
 The creditors are divided into different categories and each category will be treated differently.  Priority is given 
to creditors who provide the company with funds or goods necessary to keep a company operational during the 
reorganization (U.S.C. s. 503). Secured creditors have secured the debt by a security interest or collateral (s. 506).  
Next are the general unsecured claims; this is where the tort claims fit in (s.507). 
31
 Bankruptcy Code, section 362 (a)(1994).  See also Supra note 24. 
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2.5.1 Claimants with judgment 
Claimants whose injuries have manifested, and have received judgments setting out the 
amount of the debtor’s liability, are considered judgment creditors.32 Claimants who have 
obtained judgments prior to the petition of the debtor have valid “claims” under section 
101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a judgment is a claim.  The validity of 
the claim is not questioned, the amount of the claim is clear and the claim will be included in the 
bankruptcy case.
33
   
 
2.5.2 Claimants who have filed suit but have not obtained judgment 
Another group of claimants comprises people who have incurred injury from the debtor’s 
product, the injuries have manifested and the claimants have filed a suit prior to the debtor filing 
a petition. However, liability has not yet been determined and the amount of the damages has not 
been set.  In these types of cases, the claim is considered unliquidated (a claim where a specific 
value has not been determined) according to section 101(5)(B). Since these types of claimants 
have not yet obtained judgments, under the definition of “claim” they would be considered 
claims that may still be disputed.  For example, in the case of re Weinhold, the Bankruptcy 
Court, E.D. Wisconsin, held that a cause of action in tort is considered a claim within the 
meaning of section 101(5).
34
   
Once the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, all of the tort actions are stayed.
35
  All 
claimants (including mass tort claimants) must file proofs of claim allowing the debtor to object 
to any claims.
36
  Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under Chapter 11 and all 
core proceedings arising under it.  Section 157(b)(2) lists a number of proceedings that are 
considered to be core proceedings, but is not limiting.  Once a claimant has established a legal 
basis for a claim, if there is any dispute concerning the factual basis for the claim or the amount 
of damages claimed, a hearing is held to determine the validity and amount of the claim.
37
 The 
court can also estimate claims in order to confirm a plan but cannot liquidate or estimate 
                                                 
32
 In re Braten, 74 B.R. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
33
 Note: the “claim” if any amount of the claim has been paid out by the debtor, the claim will be reduced by that 
amount.  As well, if any part of the claim was paid out within 90 days prior to the petition, it will be caught by 
Bankruptcy Code, s.546(b) which deals with preferences.  
34
 In re Weinhold, 393 BR 623 (E.D. Wisconsin  2008). 
35
 11 USC section 362(a)(1). 
36
 Bankruptcy Code, s. 501. 
37
 Bankruptcy Code. s. 502 (b). 
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contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for 
distribution under a Chapter 11 case.
38
  As well, a debtor may apply for summary judgment on 
threshold issues that apply to all or some of the claims. For example, in Dow Corning
39
 the 
bankruptcy court used summary judgment to get rid of claims that failed to provide evidence that 
the claimant actually had the autoimmune injury claimed or provided reliable scientific evidence 
establishing causation of the injury by Dow’s product.40  The Bankruptcy Code does not set out 
procedures for how courts are to determine the validity and amount of tort claims. This is left to 
each district court to decide based on the facts of each case.
41
  Which district court will deal with 
these issues is set out under 28 USC section 157(b)(5).  
 
2.5.3   Claimants whose injuries have manifested but have yet to file a suit against the 
debtor 
Claimants with manifested injuries but who have not filed a claim against the debtor are 
similar to those that have brought actions but do not have a judgment.  The claimants’ injuries 
have manifested but the claimants have not taken any action against the debtor prior to 
bankruptcy proceedings being commenced.  As long as the claimants have manifested injuries, 
they have a claim falling within the definition of that term in section 101(5).
42
  Therefore, they 
have claims, and so long as they file and provide evidence of injury, those claims will be 
resolved by the district court and will be brought into the insolvency proceedings.
43
  
 
2.5.4 Contingent Claimants 
 Identified persons who have been exposed to a debtor’s faulty product, who have filed 
claims or who are otherwise known to the debtor but have yet to manifest an injury, are 
contingent claims. In All Media Properties, Inc.,
44
 Justice Edward H. Patton of the bankruptcy 
                                                 
38
 Bankruptcy Code s. 157(b)(2)(B). 
39
 In re Dow Corning Corp., 215 BR 346 at 360 ( E.D. Mich. 1997). 
40
 Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1999); See also: Douglas G. Smith, “Resolution of Mass Tort Claims in the Bankruptcy 
System” (2008) 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1613. 
41
 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(2)(B), 157(b)(5). 
42
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43
 28 U.S.C. s.157(b)(2)(B), 157 (b)(5). 
44
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court of Texas, S.D. Houston Division, explained the contingent nature of contract and tort 
claims as follows: 
The court concludes that claims are contingent as to liability if the debt is 
one which the debtor will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence 
or happening of an extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of the 
debtor to the alleged creditor and if such triggering event or occurrence 
was reasonably contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the 
event giving rise to the claim occurred. 
Thus, in the case of the classic contingent liability of a guarantor of a 
promissory note executed by a third party, both the creditor and guarantor 
knew there would be liability only if the principal maker defaulted.  No 
obligation arises until such default.  In the case of a tort claim for 
negligence, the parties at the time of the alleged negligent act would be 
presumed to have contemplated that the alleged tortfeasor would be liable 
only if it were so established by a competent tribunal.  Such a tort claim 
is contingent as to liability until a final judgment is entered fixing the 
rights of the parties.
45
 
 
Referring to section 101(5) (then section 101(4)) of the Bankruptcy Code, Justice Patton 
explained that “Congress has stated that creditors holding, for example, contingent, unliquidated, 
unmatured, or disputed claims have a right to participate in the bankruptcy process as 
creditors.”46  The section specifically includes contingent claims and many cases have held that 
claims whose damages have yet to manifest are included in the bankruptcy case.
47
 The 
Bankruptcy Code also contains provisions to accelerate the maturity of any unmatured claims, as 
well as allowing for the estimation and classification of them.
48
   
These types of claims are often referred to in the case law and the legal literature as “future 
claims”.  The term “future claim” is widely used in American courts and literature, but has not 
been defined in the Bankruptcy Code.  Future claimants are generally defined as a class of 
people who were exposed to the debtor’s product prior to the date of petition, but whose injuries 
have not manifested as of that date.
49
   The two main types of future claims that exist in mass tort 
                                                 
45
 Ibid. at 133. 
46
 Ibid. at 132. 
47
 See: In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. Court, ED Michigan, 1997) and Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 
Inc., 839 F.2d 198 (4
th
 Cir. 1988). 
48
 Section 502(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. The language of Bankruptcy Code,  s. 502(c) is mandatory, not 
permissive, and imposes upon the court an affirmative duty to estimate any unliquidated claim where the actual 
liquidation of the claim would unduly delay the closing of the case. See: In re Curtis, 40 BR 795 (D. Utah 1984). 
49
 In re Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc., 134 BR 255 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
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cases are those where the claimant is known but has yet to manifest injuries (contingent claims) 
and those referred to as “classic future claims,”50 where the identities and number of claimants 
are unknown and whose injuries have not yet manifested.
 51
  In the United States, contingent 
claimants (contingent as to liability) and future claimants (unknown people with unknown 
injuries), are treated the same under the heading “future claims”.   
While the general definition of future claims includes claimants who are known but have 
not experienced injury, there are cases that have made a distinction between the two types.  For 
example, Dow Corning
52
 dealt with breast implants that ruptured and caused physical 
complications.  Everyone who received the breast implants knew they had them.  While some 
had experienced negative effects, there were some who had filed proofs of claim but had not 
experienced any symptoms from exposure to the implants.  The Bankruptcy Court, E.D. 
Michigan, N.D. referred to section 101(5) and stated, “[g]iven this broad definition, there is no 
question that a personal injury claim not yet reduced to judgment falls within its scope.”53  
According to the Court, known claimants whose injuries have not manifest are included as 
claims in a bankruptcy case. A legal representative of future breast implant claimants was 
appointed and later dismissed as all claimants were present and Dow ceased manufacturing its 
product.  While all the possible claimants were known, there were still claimants whose damages 
would not be known for a number of years.   The trustee in bankruptcy appointed several 
committees to represent the differing interests of Dow’s claimants during the development of its 
plan of reorganization.   Cases dealing with contingent claims are less complicated as estimating 
the value of claims is not as difficult as estimating the number of possible claims and their value.  
As well, if a representative is appointed, the claimants can monitor their representative’s actions 
during the process. 
A case that did not make the distinction between known and unknown claimants was 
Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.
54
 In A.H. Robins, the Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive intra-uterine 
                                                 
50
 In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. Court, ED Michigan, 1997) at footnote 55. 
51
In some cases, people who have been exposed to the product post-petition but pre-confirmation are also considered 
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Unliquidated Claims in Chapter 11”, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 173 (1989). 
52
 Supra note 50. 
53
 Ibid. at 560. 
54
 Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198 (4
th
 Cir. 1988) [hereinafter A.H. Robins]. 
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device manufactured and marketed by A.H. Robins Co., had been inserted into many women and 
caused numerous physical injuries.  Production of the shield was discontinued because of 
concerns of its safety.  As there were many claims filed against A.H. Robins, it petitioned for 
reorganization under Chapter 11.  The Court of Appeal held that future claimants held claims in 
bankruptcy on the basis that a claim arises when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability are 
preformed.  Although the order precisely defining what constituted a future claim was not 
published, the notice the bankruptcy court sent out to possible claimants stated: “[t]hough not 
aware of any injury, I may have been injured by my use or another’s use of the Dalkon Shield”.55  
As the Dalkon Shield was only on the market a few years and most of the women who had it 
inserted were known, the company knew most of its claimants.  In determining whether people 
with unmanifested injuries have a valid claim in bankruptcy, the Court of appeal dealt with the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Grady, who had the device inserted many years before A.H. Robins had filed for 
bankruptcy and thought it had fallen out.  Almost two months after A.H. Robins had filed for 
bankruptcy; Mrs. Grady filed a civil action as she had developed pelvic inflammatory disease 
from using the Dalkon shield.  Mrs. Grady filed a motion with the bankruptcy court, seeking a 
judgment that her claim did not arise before the filing of the petition as the law in California did 
not allow her to sue until she knew of her injuries.  Since she had no pre-petition right to a 
payment from Robins, the argument was that the stay did not apply.  The question the 
bankruptcy court and the Court of Appeal were to determine was whether the automatic stay 
barred Mrs. Grady’s civil action.  Mrs. Grady argued that her cause of action against A.H. 
Robins did not accrue until after A.H. Robins filed a reorganization petition and therefore the 
stay did not apply to her. The Court of Appeal noted that the automatic stay only extended to 
“claims against the debtor that arose prior to the filing of its petition.”56  In order to determine 
whether the automatic stay applied to Mrs. Grady’s claim, it was necessary for the Court to 
examine the definition of “claim” in the context of the Bankruptcy Code.   
The Court of Appeal concluded that Congress intended the definition of “claim” to be as 
broad as possible.  In the Court’s opinion, the “Bankruptcy Code is superimposed upon the law 
of the state which has created the obligation. Congress has the undoubted power under the 
                                                 
55
 Ibid. at 202. 
56
 Ibid. at 200. 
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bankruptcy article, U.S. Const. Art. I s. 8 cl. 4, to define and classify claims against the estate of 
a bankruptcy…”57  The Court went on to state that:  
the legislative history shows that Congress intended that all legal 
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be 
able to be dealt with in bankruptcy.  The Code contemplates the broadest 
possible relief in the bankruptcy court.  Also, that history tells us that the 
automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by 
the bankruptcy laws.  It provides a breathing spell to the debtor to 
restructure his affairs, which could hardly be done with hundreds of 
thousands of creditors persevering in different courts all over the country 
for a first share of a debtor’s assets.  Absent a stay of litigation against 
the debtor, dismemberment rather than reorganization would, in many or 
even most cases, be the inevitable result.
58
   
The Court of Appeal examined section 101(4)(A) (now 101(5)(A)), which provides for a “right 
to payment” whether or not such right is reduced to judgment or contingent.  The court referred 
to Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979 which defined “contingent” as: 
[p]ossible, but not assured; doubtful or uncertain; conditioned upon the 
occurrence of some future event which is itself uncertain, or 
questionable.  Synonymous with provisional. This term, when applied to 
a use, remainder, devise, bequest, or other legal right or interest, implies 
that no present interest exists, and that whether such interest or right ever 
will exist depends upon a future uncertain event.
59
 
The Court held that Mrs. Grady’s claim and whatever rights the other future tort claimants had 
were “contingent”.  The Court stated:  
[i]t depends upon a future uncertain event, that event being the 
manifestation of injury from use of the Dalkon Shield.  We do not believe 
that there must be a right to the immediate payment of money in the case 
of a tort or alleged breach of warranty or like claim, as present here, 
when the acts constituting the tort or breach of warranty have occurred 
prior to the filing of the petition, to constitute a claim under §362(a)(1) 
[the stay].  It is at once apparent that there can be no right to the 
immediate payment of money on account of a claim, the existence of 
which depends upon a future uncertain event.  But it is also apparent that 
Congress has created a contingent right to payment as it has the power to 
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create a contingent tort or like claim within the protection of §362(a)(1).  
We are of the opinion that it has done so.
60
 
The Court based its decision on the literal reading of the statute and the definition of “claim”.  It 
held that: 
legislative history contemplates “the broadest possible relief in the 
bankruptcy court” … If Mrs. Grady and the Future Tort Claimants, who 
had no right to the immediate payment of money at the time of the filing 
of the petition, were participants in a Chapter 7 proceeding, the chances 
are that they would receive nothing, for no compensable result had 
manifested itself prior to the filing of the petition.
61
 
The Court concluded that Mrs. Grady held a pre-petition claim subject to the automatic stay as 
her claim arose when the events giving rise to the liability occurred.  The Court also concluded 
that Congress has the power to define and classify claims against a bankruptcy estate.  Since the 
definition of “claim” in section 101(4)(A) (now section 101(5)(A)) includes a right to payment 
that was unliquidated, disputed, unmatured or contingent, the court concluded that future claims 
were “claims” in bankruptcy.  It is important to note that the Court of Appeal did not decide 
whether the claims of future tort claimants were dischargeable.  They specifically dealt with the 
fact that the Dalkon Shield was inserted in the claimant prior to the filing of the petition and 
therefore it constituted a “claim” that arose before the commencement of the case and the court 
included it in the bankruptcy process.  Even though A.H. Robins Co. had stopped making and 
distributing the Dalkon Shields prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, there were still a large 
number of claimants who had the Dalkon Shield inserted but had yet to manifest symptoms of a 
disease.  Therefore Mrs. Grady’s claim and all future claimants who were exposed to the Dalkon 
Shield before the bankruptcy petition were included in the bankruptcy case.  
 
2.5.5 Future Claims 
In most of the American literature, a future claim has been defined as a claim whose 
existence or amount depends upon some future event which is uncertain either as to its 
                                                 
60
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61
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occurrence or as to the time of its occurrence.
62
 A true or classic future claim is one where the 
claimants are unknown and their injuries are unknown. Although the two types have been treated 
as one, the cases under contingent claims primarily involve known claimants.  The following 
cases have both unknown and known claimants involved in the reorganization, but have a larger 
number of unknown claimants.  In order to determine if unknown claimants should be included 
in bankruptcy, the courts focus on when the right to payment arises. For example, in re Eagle-
Picher,
63
 the Court held that section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code suggests that future 
claimants “ought to be those who will have a right to payment in the future, but do not have one 
right now”.64  This definition therefore includes known and unknown claimants whose right to 
payment does not arise until after the petition date.   
 All courts examine the claims and determine whether they are in existence as of the 
petition date. But they take different approaches on when future claims arise.  Some courts have 
held that potential claims are not “claims” for bankruptcy purposes and have left them out of the 
bankruptcy process because these claims do not arise in bankruptcy until a cause of action has 
accrued under non-bankruptcy law, which is the date the injury manifests itself.
65
  Other courts 
have held that future claims are valid claims in bankruptcy because they arise at the time of 
exposure to a product and have included them in the process of preparing a plan as well as 
setting up trusts for future distributions. In their view, state laws interpret the term claim more 
narrowly than Congress intended.
66
  The two lines of cases will be examined below.   
 
2.5.5.1  Future Claims not a “Claim” in Bankruptcy 
A number of cases have used state tort laws to determine whether future claims are valid 
claims in bankruptcy.
67
 State laws dealing with torts provide that potential victims with tort 
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claims have no cause of action under applicable non-bankruptcy law until the victim knows or 
should have known of the injury. As no cause of action exists under state law, these courts have 
held that future claimants do not have a claim in bankruptcy law.
68
 In re M. Frenville Co.,
69
 the 
court dealt with the issue of whether the debtor negligently and recklessly prepared bank 
statements.  In dealing with a claim that arose after the petition under Chapter 11 was filed, the 
Court stated that although “claim” was defined quite broadly in the Code:  
the Code does not define when a right to payment arises. Thus, while 
federal laws control which claims are cognizable under the Code, the 
threshold question of when a right to payment arises, absent overriding 
federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law.
70
  
The Court therefore based its decision on New York state law when dealing with future claims 
and held that “a claim for contribution or indemnification does not accrue at the time of the 
commission of the underlying act, but rather at the time of the payment of the judgment flowing 
from the act.”71 
Similarly, in UNR Indus., Inc.,
72
 the United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, referred to 
the definition of “creditor” in section 101(9) of the Bankruptcy Code (currently 101(10)(A)), 
which states that a creditor is a person who “has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time 
of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”73 The Court dealt with injuries due to 
asbestos exposure.  Claimants alleged that they contracted diseases as a result of exposure to 
asbestos manufactured or supplied by the debtor.  The Court had to decide whether to appoint a 
legal representative to represent the interests of an unknown number of individuals who had been 
exposed to asbestos and who may in the future manifest an asbestos-related disease and claim 
money from the debtors for their injury.  The debtor wanted the representative to be able to bind 
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the future claimants in order to allow for a discharge of the proceedings.  The Court stated that 
“Congress has not given the judiciary authority to adjudicate the claims of future unknown 
claimants.  The statute…does not contemplate the resolution of all problems faced by entities 
with substantial financial exposure.”74  The Court focused on Illinois state law, which states that 
a tort claim does not arise until the plaintiff suffers injury.  The court concluded that those “who 
have been exposed to asbestos some time in their lives but do not now have or do not know that 
they have an asbestos-related disease—have no claims under state law, and therefore do not have 
claims cognizable under the Code.”75   
In re Amatex Corp.,
76
 Justice William A. King of the United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. 
Pennsylvania, was asked to appoint a guardian to represent prospective asbestos claimants.  
Amatex manufactured and sold textiles containing asbestos and was named as a defendant in 
over 9,000 cases. The latency period of asbestosis was between 3 years and 40 years from 
exposure. The Court examined the issue of whether individuals exposed to asbestos whose 
symptoms had not yet manifested were entitled to a voice in the reorganization of an asbestos 
manufacturer.  Justice King stated that based on section 1141(d)(1)(A) of the Code, a debtor is 
only discharged from debts that arose prior to confirmation of the plan.
77
  He also stated that 
asbestos-related injuries do not arise until symptoms appear; therefore future claimants do not 
hold claims as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Since no cause of action existed until the 
symptoms appeared, the debt could not be discharged.  Justice King concluded that the future 
creditors did not hold “claims,”78 they were not “creditors”79 and the debtor did not owe them a 
“debt.”80  It is important to note that the Third Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision 
and ordered the appointment of a representative.  Although the Third Circuit reserved the 
question of whether future claimants are creditors, it stated that future claimants “are sufficiently 
affected by the reorganization proceedings to require some voice in them.”81   
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According to these decisions, a claim arises only when the injury is detected.  The debtor is 
only liable to the injured party when the party develops an injury.  Although there are a few 
cases that have excluded future claims on this basis, many courts in the United States have 
declined to follow Frenville’s definition of claim. As well, the Amatex decision was reversed.  
These cases focused on the fact that future claims cannot be discharged rather than focusing on 
whether they are actual claims in the Bankruptcy Code.   
 
2.5.5.2 Future Claims included in Bankruptcy 
Many courts have recognized that future claimants, both identified and unidentified 
potential claimants, have valid claims in bankruptcy proceedings even though an injury has not 
manifested itself at the time of the proceedings as long as at the time of the petition the acts that 
caused the injury have occurred. The cases that include future claims in the bankruptcy plan do 
so because “regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued under state law, the right to 
receive payment at some future time is as much a ‘claim’ as is an obligation that constitutes a 
ripe cause of action when the bankruptcy petition is filed.”82 The courts have used section 502(c) 
of the Bankruptcy Code which allows courts to estimate contingent or unliquidated claims which 
would delay the administration of the estate.  Essentially, what these courts have determined is 
that bankruptcy accelerates the maturity of all unmatured claims and therefore future claims 
should be accelerated and included in the bankruptcy case.  Estimating future claims benefits 
both the claimants and the debtor by reducing costs (of litigating early on), speeding up the 
reorganization and helping the court to determine whether a plan of reorganization is even 
possible.   
The first mass tort case to include future claimants in a bankruptcy plan was In re Johns-
Manville Corp.
 83
  Johns-Manville used Chapter 11 to resolve thousands of asbestos claims.  
Johns-Manville was a manufacturer of asbestos products, the exposure to which caused a variety 
of respiratory diseases, including lung cancer.  Johns-Manville began dealing with product 
liability lawsuits and predicted a larger number was yet to come.  It filed for protection under 
Chapter 11.  A motion was put forward to appoint a legal representative for asbestos-exposed 
future claimants.  It was clear that the Johns-Manville reorganization would have to be 
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accountable to future asbestos claimants and, therefore, it needed to safeguard the future 
claimants’ interests and leave a sufficient residue of assets to accommodate a resolution of the 
Johns-Manville asbestos-related health problem.
84
  The United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. 
New York, defined “future asbestos health claimants” as people who had been exposed to 
asbestos or asbestos-containing products that were mined, fabricated, manufactured, supplied or 
sold by Johns-Manville prior to the petition date but who had not yet manifested injuries or filed 
claims.  A key factor in this case was that the asbestos injuries may have had a latency period of 
many years.  The court acknowledged that if the future claimants were not dealt with in the 
reorganization, it could potentially force the sale or liquidation of Johns-Manville’s assets and 
the dissolution of its business.  Liquidating the company would leave many asbestos claimants 
uncompensated.  In his decision, Justice Lifland stated: “the key aim of Chapter 11 [is] to avoid 
liquidation at all reasonable costs.”85  If Johns-Manville were to be liquidated it would leave 
many asbestos claimants uncompensated.  As well, Johns-Manville was a large company that 
employed many people. If the company were subjected to liquidation bankruptcy many jobs 
would be lost.  
Although the Court did not specifically deal with the definition of “claim,” it focused on 
section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that any “party in interest” may appear and 
be heard.  The section specifically states: 
Any party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditor’s 
committee, an equity security holders’ committee, an equity holder, or 
any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any 
issue in a case under this chapter.
86
 
“Party in interest” is not defined in the Code.  The Court stated that this term should be construed 
broadly, that its predecessor section, section 206, “represented an effort to encourage and 
promote individual participation in reorganization cases by creditors and stockholders and to 
foster democratization of such cases.”87  The Court stated that section 1109(b) continues 
broadening the concept of “party in interest.” The Court appointed a legal guardian for the future 
claimants on the reasoning that even if future claimants did not have claims under then section 
101(4) of the Code they were at least “parties in interest” under section 1109(b) and therefore 
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had a right to be heard in the proceedings.  The Court went on to state that the list in section 
1109(b) was not meant to exclude any parties, as “including” is defined in section 102(3) was not 
limiting.  The Court held that section 1109(b) was broad enough to “embrace the interests of 
future claimants as affected parties.”88 The Court concluded that:  
Future claimants are undeniably parties in interest to these reorganization 
proceedings pursuant to the broad, flexible definition of that term…The 
drafting of “party in interest” as an elastic concept was designed for just 
this kind of situation…..future claimants are indeed the central focus of 
the entire reorganization.  Any plan not dealing with their interests 
precludes a meaningful and effective reorganization and thus inures to 
the detriment of the reorganization body politic.  Any meaningful plan 
will either provide funding for future claimants directly or provide for the 
continuation of some form of responsive, ongoing entity post-
confirmation, from which to glean assets with which to pay them.  If they 
are denied standing as parties in interest, they will be denied all 
opportunity either to help design the ship that sails away from these 
reorganization proceedings with their cargo on board or to assert their 
interests during a pre-launching distribution….In either event, the direct 
impact on these claimants will be enormous …..any plan of 
reorganization must necessarily balance the rights and needs of 
prepetition creditors against the anticipated rights and needs of 
postpetition creditors with Manville’s purportedly limited assets and 
further economic prospects apportioned accordingly.”89 
The future claimants were not given “claim” status and did not obtain all the entitlements 
associated with this status.  The Court appointed a legal representative to participate on behalf of 
unidentified future claimants and allowed people who claimed to have been exposed to 
participate in the proceedings even though they had yet to develop any illness.  The Court 
declared that it is “the unprecedented, extraordinary nature of these proceedings that mandates a 
declaration that these claimants are parties in interest under Code Section 1109(b) and in need of 
a legal representative to act independently and impartially where appropriate in the case.”90  The 
Court referred to its equitable powers from section 1481 of Title 28, U.S. Code and section 
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code that allows the court to “enable it to respond to extraordinary 
equitable problems in estate administration consistent with the statutory goals of Chapter 11 of 
Title 11 U.S.C.”91 
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The definition of “claim” in an asbestos mass tort case was also dealt with by the New 
York bankruptcy court in Quigley Co., Inc.
92
  Quigley was in the business of developing, 
producing and marketing a number of products, some of which contained asbestos.  As of the 
petition date, it was established that 212,000 asbestos personal injury claims were pending or 
would be asserted against it.  The Court examined the issue of whether a person whose right to 
payment is not enforceable under state law can have a “claim” in bankruptcy and be entitled to a 
vote.  The Court held that the definition of “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code is very broad and 
was “intended to reach all legal obligations, no matter how remote, and deal with them in the 
bankruptcy case.”93 The Court also stated that:  “bankruptcy only discharges ‘claims’ and a 
narrow definition of ‘claim’ would undercut the ‘fresh start’ policy so important to bankruptcy 
law.”94  The Court held that the broad definition of “claim,” “can encompass a right to payment 
that is not enforceable under state law.”95  The Court stated that a personal injury claimant’s pre-
petition: 
exposure to asbestos gave rise to a “claim”, regardless of whether the law 
of any particular state renders the cause of action unenforceable until 
some future contingency occurs.  If the Asbestosis PI Claimant was 
exposed to asbestos before the Quigley petition date, he or she holds a 
“claim”.96 
Therefore, claimants’ status in bankruptcy does not depend on the manifestation of an injury or 
“on a state or court made rule that delays enforcement of the cause of action unless and until the 
injury becomes manifest.”97 It depends on when a person was exposed to the product.  The Court 
estimated the future claims for voting purposes only. 
As a safeguard, when a company is reorganizing under Chapter 11, unsecured creditors are 
represented by a committee of creditors selected by the trustee.
98
  The committees may retain 
lawyers, accountants and investment advisors to assist them (with court approval).  Bankruptcy 
courts have appointed legal representation for classes of future claimants although it is not 
expressly provided for in the Bankruptcy Code.    Whether or not a court has held that the future 
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claimants hold a valid “claim” or are a “party in interest”, they are all provided with 
representation and included in the bankruptcy case.
99
  
 
2.5.5.3 Summary of United States position on Unmanifested Claims 
Although many state laws preclude causes of action based on personal injury until the 
injury manifests itself, the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude individuals from being included 
in a bankruptcy debtor’s plan since such individuals hold an interest or claim in the debtors’ 
estate.
100
  Bankruptcy courts estimate mass tort personal injury claims to determine the feasibility 
of a plan of reorganization as this estimation provides a mechanism to quantify the extent of the 
debtor’s liability to the holders of mass tort claims.  Estimating claims helps to define the amount 
of money that will be required to be paid out in order to determine if a possible consensual 
resolution of the mass tort claims is possible.
101
 This estimation, according to section 1129 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, shall set a fixed outer limit on the amount a debtor will pay for contingent tort 
claims.
102
 Typically in the United States, mass tort cases address claims by establishing either or 
both a claims resolution facility and a claimants’ trust as demonstrated in the A.H. Robins and 
Quigley cases.  These cases focused on the intention of the Bankruptcy Code to provide the 
debtor with a fresh start while attempting to balance the needs of claimants who have yet to 
suffer the full extent of their injuries.   
The way in which mass tort claims are treated in the United States varies among courts and 
cases but the legislation is broad enough for the inclusion of future claims under a Chapter 11 
application.  Two different sections of the Bankruptcy Code have been used to include future 
mass torts in bankruptcy reorganizations.  Some courts have held that victims whose disease has 
not yet manifest itself were parties in interest under 11 U.S.C. section 1109 and allowed the 
claimant to take part in the bankruptcy proceedings.
103
 While other courts have included future 
claims as “claims” under 11 U.S.C. section 101(5), basing their decision on the fact that the 
definition of claim is broad enough to include these types of claims.  A “claim” therefore exists 
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when a claimant’s exposure to a product gave rise to the “claim.” Therefore, many cases have 
held that the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim” and its estimation provisions 
provide for a future right to payment because of the debtors pre-bankruptcy conduct, even if it 
will never ripen into a cause of action by the manifestation of an injury.
104
 Whatever section the 
court uses to include future claims, the general consensus is that if a claimant was exposed pre-
petition and he or she developed symptoms or died pre-petition, their claims would clearly be 
included in the bankruptcy case.  If the claimant was exposed pre-petition but developed no 
symptoms until post-petition (for example, future claimant) the case law concludes the claim is a 
pre-petition one.  By accepting future claimants as “parties in interest” or “claims”, bankruptcy 
courts dealing with mass torts have allowed future claimants to take part in or benefit from the 
reorganization.  Although contingent claims and classic future claims have been treated as one in 
American courts, there is an important difference.  The possible error in estimation is greatly 
reduced when only the estimation of the damages is required rather than the number of 
claimants.  In the Johns-Manville case, the number of claimants was underestimated and, as a 
result, the entire plan was overhauled.  In A.H. Robins, there was much less error as the number 
of claimants was known.  As well, even though representatives are appointed to represent all 
future claims, those who are known can monitor their representative’s actions whereas claimants 
who are unknown cannot monitor their representative in bankruptcy negotiations.  
 
2.5.6 Post-petition Exposure Claims 
Claimants whose exposure to the faulty product occurs after the petition has been filed 
(post-petition) can be divided into two categories, (i) exposure post-petition but before 
confirmation of a plan (pre-confirmation) and (ii) exposure that occurs after confirmation of a 
plan (post-confirmation). 
 
2.5.6.1 Post-Petition but Pre-Confirmation Exposure 
If a claimant is exposed to a product post-petition but pre-confirmation, the claim is 
categorized as an “administrative expense”.  No matter what definition of “claim” a court may 
use to determine the validity of a claim in bankruptcy, when a victim is not exposed to the toxic 
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substance until after bankruptcy proceedings have begun, he or she is not considered to be a 
claimant. Neither the courts that use the state laws of discoverability nor the courts that use the 
more expanded definition of “claim” accept post-petition exposure as claims.  
 Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “creditor” as an entity that arises prior to 
the date of petition, while section 1141(d)(1)(A)  states that claims that can be discharged are 
those that arose prior to confirmation of a plan.  Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
“administrative expenses” section, deals with the gap between the petition date and the 
confirmation date and has been used to include claimants who are exposed to the product post-
petition but pre-confirmation in the bankruptcy case.  Section 503(b)(1)(A) states that 
“administrative expenses” are those that: 
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative 
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, 
including— 
(1) (A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate including— 
(i) wages, salaries, and commissions for services rendered 
after the commencement of the case; and... 
 
The word, “including” does not limit administrative expenses to only those listed in the 
section.  Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define an “administrative expense”, it does 
state that the term includes debts other than those deemed to arise prior to the petition date that 
are incurred after the commencement of the case in order to preserve the estate.
105
 The words, 
“necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate” in section 503(b)(1)(A), have been 
examined by the courts.  The Supreme Court held in Reading v. Brown,
106
 that post-petition tort 
claims arising against a Chapter 11 estate from the continued operation of a bankrupt business 
should be treated as administrative claims, and that tort claims are “costs ordinarily incident to 
[the] operation of a business”.107  A similar conclusion was reached in re Alan Wood Steel Co.,108 
in which the court held that torts arising post-petition are administrative expenses regardless of 
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whether they result from a receivers efforts to preserve the estate. By labeling post-petition but 
pre-confirmation exposure claims as “administrative expenses” the bankruptcy courts have been 
able to include them in the mass tort bankruptcy case. 
 
2.5.6.2 Post-Confirmation Exposure 
If a pre-petition relationship does not exist between the victim and the debtor or its 
product, and the victim is only exposed to the toxic product after a plan of reorganization has 
been confirmed, the victim has a post-confirmation claim.  These claims are neither subject to 
the automatic stay nor to the bankruptcy discharge.  All cases have held that a pre-petition 
relationship must exist between the debtor and the future claimants, be it contact or exposure in 
order for them to be included in the bankruptcy case. For example, in re Piper Aircraft Corp.,
109
 
the court dealt with a debtor company, Piper, that had designed, manufactured and sold general 
aviation aircraft and spare parts.  Piper was reorganizing under Chapter 11.  Thereafter, there 
were thousands of planes still operational in the United States and there were thousands of 
lawsuits based on its manufacture and design of aircraft parts.  It was known that some of the 
planes will crash, injuring or killing people in the planes.  The court examined whether future 
claimants, in the context of people who were exposed to the products post-confirmation, could 
hold claims in the bankruptcy case.  The court stated that it is impossible to determine who will 
belong to the class of creditors and whether any prepetition relationship to the debtor will give 
rise to their potential future cause of action.  The court stated that:   
The concept of “claim” cannot be extended to include unidentified and 
presently unidentifiable potential claimants against the Debtor, claimants 
whose rights depend entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences and not 
on any prepetition relationship to the Debtor.  Congress may have 
intended the broadest possible definition of claim, but that definition still 
has limits.  One such limit is present here.
110
 
Many courts have followed the Piper decision and have excluded post-confirmation exposure 
claims from the bankruptcy case. 
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2.6 Classes 
Once all of the types of claims have been identified, Chapter 11 requires all of the claims 
against the debtor to be placed into classes.
111
  The only restriction is that all claims or interests 
in each class are substantially similar to the other claims or interests in that class.  The 
Bankruptcy Code focuses on group rights rather than individual ones. The classes are set up 
primarily on the basis of how they will be treated, for example, if they are to share in the 
distribution pro rata or receive the full amount of their claim.  Once the classes are established, 
according to section 1123(b)(1), a Chapter 11 plan “may impair, or leave unimpaired, any class 
of claims, secured or unsecured interests.”112  This forces everyone with a financial interest in the 
debtor to come to the bargaining table.  If a debtor is facing mass tort liability and the company 
may be subject to liquidation because of all of the lawsuits that are being filed against it, the only 
feasible solution may be to pay all claimants, including present and future claimants, less than 
what they would have received from individual litigation. Having all of the various creditors, 
commercial and tort, sharing in the corporation’s financial difficulties provides the court with the 
ability to impair several classes, as “the bankruptcy system provides a unique mechanism for 
spreading the loss faced by mass tort liability among all creditor and shareholder groups.”113   
 
2.7  The Plan 
Section 1123 of The Bankruptcy Code deals with what must be included in the plan.  
Section 1123(a) lists the mandatory provisions of the plan while section 1123(b) lists the 
discretionary provisions.
114
  Although section 1123 contains many provisions dealing with what 
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must and may be included in the plan, the requirements are very general and broad, which allow 
companies to structure the plan and include a variety of claims in the plan. Thus a plan may 
“include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this 
title.”115  The courts dealing with mass tort cases have found that the Bankruptcy Code allows 
them to create trusts for the tort victims and impose injunctions on the victims, ensuring they 
                                                                                                                                                             
(C) merger or consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons; 
(D) sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either subject to or free of any lien, or the 
distribution of all or any part of the property of the estate among those having an interest in such property 
of the estate; 
(E) satisfaction or modification of any lien; 
(F) cancellation or modification of any indenture or similar instrument; 
(G) curing or waiving of any default; 
(H) extension of a maturity date or a change in an interest rate or other term of outstanding securities; 
(I) amendment of the debtor’s charter; or 
(J) issuance of securities of the debtor, or of any entity referred to in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this 
paragraph, for cash, for property, for existing securities, or in exchange for claims or interests, or for any 
other appropriate purpose; 
(6) provide for the inclusion in the charter of the debtor, if the debtor is a corporation, or of any corporation 
referred to in paragraph (5)(B) or (5)(C) of this subsection, of a provision prohibiting the issuance of 
nonvoting equity securities, and providing, as to the several classes of securities possessing voting power, an 
appropriate distribution of such power among such classes, including, in the case of any class of equity 
securities having a preference over another class of equity securities with respect to dividends, adequate 
provisions for the election of directors representing such preferred class in the event of default in the payment 
of such dividends; 
(7) contain only provisions that are consistent with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and 
with public policy with respect to the manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee under the plan 
and any successor to such officer, director, or trustee; and 
(8) in a case in which the debtor is an individual, provide for the payment to creditors under the plan of all or 
such portion of earnings from personal services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case 
or other future income of the debtor as is necessary for the execution of the plan. 
(b) Subject to subsection (a) of this section, a plan may— 
(1) impair or leave unimpaired any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests; 
(2) subject to section 365 of this title, provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not previously rejected under such section; 
(3) provide for— 
(A) the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate; or 
(B) the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative of the estate 
appointed for such purpose, of any such claim or interest; 
(4) provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the 
proceeds of such sale among holders of claims or interests; 
(5) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in 
real property that is the debtor’s principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected 
the rights of holders of any class of claims; and 
(6) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title. 
(c) In a case concerning an individual, a plan proposed by an entity other than the debtor may not provide for the 
use, sale, or lease of property exempted under section 522 of this title, unless the debtor consents to such use, sale, 
or lease. 
(d) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and sections 506(b), 1129(a)(7), and 1129(b) of this title, if it is 
proposed in a plan to cure a default the amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in accordance with 
the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
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turn to the trust when their injuries manifest themselves as opposed to the reorganized company 
for compensation.  The trusts may be funded by payments from the debtor, co-defendants, 
insurance settlement proceeds, stock in the company, bonds as well as a percentage of a 
company’s profits.116 
Setting up trusts does not contradict the Bankruptcy Code. Section 157(b)(2)(B), which 
deals with the core proceedings that are to be included in the plan, states:   
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to- 
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions 
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the 
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12 or 13 of title 11…but 
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal 
injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of 
distribution in a case under title 11…117 
Thus, the court has the authority to estimate personal injury or wrongful death claims in order for 
the claimants and creditors to vote on a plan and to determine its feasibility.
118
  This is simply an 
estimation, not the amount a claimant will receive; it is only a step in developing  a plan that will 
successfully restructure the debtor while at the same time determine the system for compensating 
future victims. 
Two goals of Chapter 11 are to provide a fresh start for the debtor and to ensure equal 
treatment of all of the creditors involved.  Bankruptcy courts “must balance the policy of the 
debtor’s right to a ‘fresh start’ against the fundamental fairness and due process rights of future 
claimants.”119  The use of the broadest definition of “claim” provides for the best possible 
outcome for the debtor by ensuring its reorganization will end all claims arising pre-petition.  By 
including future tort claimants in the plan, American courts attempt to balance future tort 
claimants who at the time of the petition are unidentified or extent of whose injuries are 
unknown, with present claimants whose injuries have at the time of the plan manifest 
themselves.  When preparing the reorganization plan, the debtor estimates how many future 
claims exist and how much it will cost a company. A difficulty associated with including future 
claimants in the plan is determining what funds should be put aside into trusts for them, how 
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much is to be paid out to current claimants and what resources must be left to the company to 
allow it to continue.  If a plan reserves too much money for future claimants, current creditors 
will receive less.  If the plan does not deal with future claimants at all, current creditors will 
deplete the fund and future claimants will not receive anything under the plan; their claims will 
not be discharged but they will have to sue the debtor and go through the courts.  This could 
result in unequal treatment of creditors because future claimants may receive much less than 
current ones if funds are not available after a plan has been approved.  In some situations, they 
may receive much more.  As well, not including future claimants in a plan can affect the debtor’s 
ability to obtain future financing.  The existence of many outstanding claims could drive the 
debtor into liquidation as it will have to continue to defend or pay all outstanding undischarged 
claims.
120
 Should this occur, the future claimants would receive nothing.  Many mass tort cases 
have gone through the bankruptcy courts since 1982 and have all dealt with mass tort claims in 
their own way. A few of the more prominent cases and their plans are summarized below. 
 
2.7.1 Johns Manville Corporation 
Johns Manville was the first company to use Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to resolve 
thousands of asbestos claims.  It took more than four years of negotiations to develop a plan that 
all parties involved in the reorganization could accept. The plan established an Asbestos Health 
Trust.  The trust dealt with current personal injury claimants as well as future claims.  The Court 
issued an injunction channeling all asbestos-related personal injury claims, both present and 
future, to the trust to protect Johns-Manville from lawsuits that could endanger the 
reorganization.
121
  Johns-Manville set a precedent for channeling all of the claims to a post-
confirmation trust.   
The trust arrangement sets out a number of procedures.  First, the claimants had to attempt 
to settle their claims with trust representatives.  Second, if they could not reach a settlement, the 
claimants could choose to go to mediation, binding arbitration or traditional tort litigation.  If 
they chose to go through traditional tort litigation, they would be given the full amount of 
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damages they were awarded as compensation, but were not to receive punitive damages.  
Unfortunately, there were major flaws in the plan. The numbers of claims was underestimated 
and the administrative costs were very high. The result was that the plan had to be overhauled in 
1991.  As of March 30, 1990 the trust had received more than 150,000 claims, which was 50 
percent more than the highest number estimated when the plan was approved.  As well, the costs 
used to satisfy the claims were also almost twice the predicted average.  By the spring of 1990, 
the trust was out of money.
122
  Payments out of the revised trust did not begin until 1995.   
 
2.7.2 A.H. Robins Co. 
The reorganization of A.H. Robins,
123
 also known as the Dalkon Shield case, dealt with 
thousands of women who had used the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device and claimed that it 
caused a number of injuries that included birth defects, infant death, ectopic pregnancies, septic 
abortions, non-surgical infertility, pelvic inflammatory disease and uncontrolled bleeding. Prior 
to establishing a plan, the bankruptcy court carried out a detailed process to estimate how much 
money would be needed to satisfy all of the current and future claims.  The Dalkon Shield 
Claimants Trust was established to deal with all of the tort claims against the debtor.   
The plan set up a Claims Resolution Facility (CRF), which was to be run by five court-
appointed independent trustees to resolve the personal injury claims.  The CRF provided general 
guidelines for settling all of the claims and based them on three principles:  the “fairness 
principle”, the “efficiency principle” and the “settlement principle.”124 In general the trustees 
attempted to treat all claimants equally and fairly by focusing on the claimants as a group rather 
than individually.  They also tried to keep the administrative expenses low and encouraged 
settlement and timely payment of claims instead of turning to arbitration and litigation.
125
 The 
application process the trustees chose was set up so people could enter claims without the need 
of legal representation.  They attempted to create an equal playing field for both the defendant 
and plaintiffs as opposed to the adversarial model which often results in unequal justice weighted 
heavily in favour of the powerful companies.   
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The CRF provided “a best and final offer/no negotiation”126 approach to control the amount 
of compensation offered to the claimants based on the specific injuries that were received by the 
claimants. As well, it promoted and encouraged everyone to settle by providing each claimant as 
high an offer as possible for the injuries they received without depleting the fund.   The amount 
of compensation the debtor offered each claimant was based on medical evidence that the 
claimant provided.  The plan provided each claimant with three different avenues for entering a 
claim.  Each option was made available for the various types of claimants who could choose 
which procedure worked best for them.  Also each option had a payment schedule for each type 
of injury.   
Option 1 provided a quick payment scheme which was ideal for people who either did not 
have good medical proof that the Dalkon Shield caused their injuries or that their injuries were 
extensive. The claimant had to execute an affidavit that she used the Dalkon Shield and was 
injured, or believed she was injured, by the use of it. Plaintiffs who chose this option were 
offered $725.
127
  
Option 2 was for claimants with valid proof that they had used the Dalkon Shield and 
medical proof that it was associated with the injury that they were suffering but that they also 
had serious alternative medical causation issues.  Claimants usually received a higher payment 
than under option one as long as they produced more evidence.  The payments ranged from $400 
to $5,500 depending on the severity of the claimants injury. 
Option 3 was to provide settlement offers “based on the pre-petition historical settlement 
amounts for claimants with serious and provable Dalkon Shield injuries.”128  Each claim in this 
class was given an individualized review.  Claimants who rejected the settlement offer were 
given the option to attend a settlement conference.  The settlement conference was not a 
negotiation, it was simply a forum for the trustees to point out the weaknesses of the plaintiff’s 
claim. If the claimant did not accept the settlement offer after the conference, she could elect to 
proceed to binding arbitration or trial.  The amount paid out ranged from $125 to over $2 million 
per claim.   In order to keep costs down, the trustees provided an alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) process to quickly deal with these cases. Of the cases that did go to trial, the outcomes 
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were very close to what the claimants were offered initially.
129
  The court also set deadlines 
requiring the plaintiffs who had elected trial to go to trial and have their claims heard by a certain 
date.  If they could not be completed by that date they were to go to arbitration. 
The A.H. Robins trust also had provisions to distribute the remaining funds on a pro rata 
basis to all tort claimants, after the last claim was paid out.  The trust was completed at the end of 
1998. It took a total of nine years to resolve all of the claims against the defendants, which was 
half of the time they expected to have all of the claims completed.  In terms of a mass tort case, 
the time it took to complete this case is considered a successful reorganization as the company 
continued its business and the claimants/creditors were all paid out. 
 
2.7.3 Dow Corning 
The Dow Corning Corporation produced silicone gel breast implants and provided raw 
materials to other manufacturers of silicone breast implants.  It was later discovered that silicone 
breast implants were causing various autoimmune injuries.  During the early 1990s, Dow 
Corning was being sued by tens of thousands of claimants.  On May 15, 1995 it filed for 
bankruptcy.  In 1996 Dow Corning filed a plan but it was not until 1998 that all parties came to 
an agreement.  Dow Corning proposed a $4.4 billion reorganization plan; approximately $3.2 
billion was set aside for the claimants.  All of the tort claimants, both present and future, were 
channeled to the trust funds. The plan provided for two trusts into which the funds would be 
paid.  The first was the Settlement Trust.  It channeled all claims into a settlement facility where 
claimants were to prove their injuries.  A payment schedule was set out based on the severity of 
injuries and the proof provided.  Settlement levels ranged from expedited payments of $2000 to 
$300,000 for most severe injuries.  The second trust was the Litigation Trust Fund.  Claimants 
who opted to apply under this fund were entitled to jury trials and could possibly receive larger 
settlements.  The settlement process began in 2003.  The settlement facility began making 
payments to claimants on June 1, 2004 and as of July 31, 2012, payments were still being 
made.
130
   Similar to A.H. Robins, Dow Corning would be considered a successful reorganization 
as payments are being made to claimants, and continue to do so as new claims arise.  The trust is 
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well funded by Dow and insurance proceeds.  As well, Dow provides a predetermined amount 
into the trust on a yearly basis.  
All of the above cases demonstrate that every plan is based on the facts of the case and the 
types of claims and injuries involved. Cases that expedite claims with minor injuries or 
insufficient proof of causation allow for a shorter reorganization process and they involve fewer 
funds for administrative expenses. All of the cases funnelled present and future claims tort 
claims into trust funds systems.  This approach allowed the companies to survive and 
successfully reorganize while at the same time providing creditors with compensation.  As these 
cases demonstrate, taking a decade or more to pay out claims is quite common.  These cases 
have “long tails” but do eventually pay out all of the claims and continue their business, which 
helps fund the trusts. 
 
2.8  Confirmation of Plan 
Once a plan has been developed, the claimants vote whether to accept or reject it.  For a 
class of creditors to accept a plan,
131
 it must be accepted by creditors that hold at least two-thirds 
in dollar amount and more than one-half of the number of claims in each class.  A class that is 
not impaired by a plan is presumed to have accepted the plan
132
 and a class is deemed not to have 
accepted a plan if the plan provides that the claimants are not entitle to receive or retain any 
property under the plan.
133
  A future claimants’ representative (FRC) is empowered to accept or 
reject a plan on behalf of the claimants.  The FRC serves as a fiduciary to future claimants. 
134
  
The FCR negotiates on the future claimants behalf and also votes on the plan.  Bankruptcy Code 
section 524(g) specifically deals with the appointment of a future claims representative for 
asbestos cases only.  Section 524(g) allows the court to direct future claimants to assert their 
claims against a trust established through the bankruptcy.    Section 524(g) does not specify the 
FCR’s role, but according to Johns-Manville, the FCR is meant to have a fiduciary role with 
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respect to negotiating a possible plan and in representing future claimants’ interests in the course 
of the bankruptcy case.
135
 
Cases that do not involve asbestos have also involved appointed FCRs.  In  A.H. Robins the 
Court appointed an FCR as one of the official committees appointed in the case.
136
 In UNR 
Indus., the Court approved the appointment of someone to represent the interests of people 
exposed to asbestos but who had yet to manifest symptoms. The representative was given powers 
of an official creditors committee under section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 1103 
provides the FCR the ability to consult with the trustee with respect to the administration of the 
estate, participate in the formation of a plan and file with the court whether the plan is accepted 
or rejected.
137
 Similarly, in Dow, the Court appointed several committees to represent different 
interests of the various claimants.  
 Once the plan has been accepted by the claimants, it must be confirmed by the bankruptcy 
court before it has legal effect and, thereby bind all of the parties included in the plan.  Section 
1129 provides specific requirements that must be met for a plan to be confirmed.  These 
provisions are intended to protect creditor and equity interest holder rights.  Section 1129(a)(7), 
also known as the “best interest of creditors test,” provides that every impaired class of claims 
must accept the plan or receive at least the liquidation value of its claim.  If a creditor does not 
receive at least its liquidation value, that individual creditor may, by voting against the plan, 
prevent it from being confirmed, no matter how small or large the amount of this creditor’s claim 
is. Section 1129(a)(11) allows a court to confirm a plan even though not all classes accepted it as 
long as the court finds that the company will not go into liquidation or require further 
reorganization.  This is also known as the “feasibility standard” and provides some assurance 
that the plan will likely work.  Even if a class rejects the plan, a court, under section 1129(b) can 
still confirm it.  This is known as the “cram down” provision and is only to be used at the request 
of a proponent of the plan.  The court will confirm the plan only if “the plan does not 
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discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests 
that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan”.138   
Once a plan of reorganization is confirmed, it becomes binding on all creditors and equity 
interest holders, on the debtor and any entity receiving property or issuing securities under the 
plan as well as binding on any creditor whether or not its claim is impaired under the plan or 
whether they voted to accept it.
139
 There is no way for an objecting shareholder to opt out of the 
plan.  It is also very difficult to get revocation of an order confirming a plan.
140
  This broad 
ability to discharge most, if not all, of the claims against the debtor make Chapter 11 an 
attractive option for companies looking for a global and final resolution of its financial issues.
141
   
Bankruptcy courts may enter injunctions discharging all claims against the debtor
142
 and 
channel any future claims to a post-confirmation trust.
143
 According to section 523 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a general negligence claim against the debtor is dischargeable. All tort claims 
that have been reduced to judgment or have a clear debt owed will be discharged.   It can be 
argued that future claims not reduced to judgment may be discharged (subject to the plan) 
because section 1141(d)(1)(A) states that confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from any 
debt that arose before the date of confirmation whether the claim is allowed or slated to receive 
any distributions under the plan unless the plan provides otherwise with respect to any debt that 
arose before the plan was confirmed.
144
 But according to section 157(b)(2)(B), future claims 
cannot be discharged, until the claim has been reduced to judgment.  Future claims will not be 
reduced to judgment until they manifest and a claim proving damages is submitted.  Channeling 
future claims into trusts allows the plan to be accepted, the reorganization to be completed and 
the future claims will then be dealt with by the trusts.
145
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2.9   Conclusion 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy has become the forum of choice for many American companies 
facing mass tort claims.  The traditional tort system and other non-bankruptcy collective 
proceedings (including class actions) do not take into consideration the overall financial 
condition of the defendant.  Judges and juries determine compensatory damages based solely on 
the defendant’s ability to pay the present claimants’ award and do not consider its ability to pay 
others who may still have claims in the future.  In Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations, 
although claims are fixed or estimated without regard to the debtor’s financial condition, when 
the actual distribution scheme is being determined the debtor’s financial ability is used to 
determine the amount that will actually be paid to each creditor based on a priority scheme.
146
 
One of the main goals of the reorganization process is to protect the business enterprise by 
“preserving its going concern value” 147 in order to provide the maximum value possible for 
distribution to its creditors.
148
  It has been stated that: 
[i]n theory, incorporating all claimants into the collective bankruptcy 
process should be workable and universally beneficial: mass future 
claimants would benefit from the segregation of assets on their behalf, 
which otherwise will be exhausted long before they would be entitled to 
collect, while present creditors would benefit by the enhancement in the 
debtor’s going concern value and the company’s rejuvenated ability to 
attract new capital that will accompany a global resolution to the 
company’s massive liability problems.149 
The Bankruptcy Code provides a broad definition of “claim” and “debtor” to allow everyone 
involved with the company or who may have a claim against it to be dealt with under one forum;  
and when the process is complete, it provides for a global resolution and discharge of all debts 
except as provided for in the reorganization plan.
150
 
While not a perfect system, as it may take years to resolve a particular case — it took the 
Johns-Manville case over a decade to conclude — it is the only system that allows for all of the 
issues that a company faces in a mass tort case to be dealt with in one forum.  Chapter 11 
contains provisions for consolidating the great bulk of claims against the debtor into a single 
forum.  It provides a bankruptcy court with the power to stop all individual collection efforts and 
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to oversee the orderly reorganization of the debtor rather than driving the debtor into bankruptcy.  
The Bankruptcy Code includes most of the claims that arise in mass tort cases while providing 
procedural safeguards for both creditors and debtors.  Since the debtor is able to continue its 
business, the trusts can be well funded providing compensation to more than just the first people 
who filed claims before a company went bankrupt. 
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CHAPTER 3:  MASS TORT INSOLVENCY IN CANADA 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Companies facing mass tort claims and experiencing financial distress in Canada currently 
have two statutes they can turn to: the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)
151
 and the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).  Neither statute is specifically designed to deal 
with mass tort issues. If a company is unable to pay all of the claims filed against it, it may 
choose to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the BIA with the result that all of its property 
will be liquidated and distributed to its creditors.  The second option is to attempt to reorganize 
the debtor company under the CCAA. This allows a company to deal with all of its creditors 
including tort claimants, avoid bankruptcy, and possibly, restructure its financial affairs.    
Choosing to use the CCAA is especially important if a company wants to continue to exist. An 
example of the complexity involved in these cases is the most notable Canadian mass tort case, 
the Canadian Red Cross Reorganization.  
The Red Cross
152
 case was the first case in Canada to include tort claimants as key 
creditors in the CCAA process.
153
  There were $8 billion in tort claims from thousands of people 
who alleged that they had received contaminated blood products from the Red Cross as a result 
of inadequate testing and screening of the blood.
154
   These people had contracted one of three 
deadly illnesses: HIV, HCV and CJD.
155
 In his judgment, Justice Blair of the Ontario Court of 
Justice, General Division summarized the complexity and effect of the Red Cross reorganization 
as: 
[a]ll insolvency re-organizations involve unfortunate situations, both 
from personal and monetary perspectives.  Many which make their way 
through the courts have implications beyond simply the resolution of the 
debt structure between corporate debtor and creditors.  They touch the 
lives of employees.  They have an impact on the continued success of 
others who do business with the debtor company.  Occasionally, they 
affect the fabric of a community itself.  None, however, has been 
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characterized by the deep human and, indeed, institutional tragedy which 
has given rise to the restructuring of the Canadian Red Cross.
156
 
The Red Cross was not only in charge of the blood services for Canada, it also dealt with disaster 
relief, homemaker services and international relief and crisis intervention.  The tort claimants 
were not the only claimants involved in the reorganization.  There were many trade creditors and 
almost ten thousand employees who also had claims against the Red Cross.  The courts had to 
balance the various interests of the creditors involved with the Red Cross while attempting to 
compensate victims and their families for the “deep human” tragedies that occurred.  They also 
had to try to find a way to have the company survive and successfully continue for the 
employees and all of the people who depended on the Red Cross’s services.  The CCAA allowed 
the court to look at all of the interests involved and attempt to find a global solution that dealt 
with all of the creditors and tort claimants while finding a way for the company to survive and 
continue to assist those who depended on the Red Cross.   
Once a company applies for CCAA protection, a court will determine if a company is 
eligible for such protection by examining the issue of insolvency. If it is eligible for protection 
the court will stay proceedings against the company.  The types of claims that are included in the 
CCAA range from ordinary commercial creditors to tort claimants.
157
  Once the court determines 
what claims will be allowed in the reorganization, a Plan is developed and the creditors and the 
court must then approve it. In the following paragraphs, the Red Cross case is used as an 
example of how Canadian courts deal with mass tort claims. The background to the case and the 
various aspects of the CCAA proceedings are addressed. 
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3.2 History of the CCAA 
The CCAA was enacted in 1933,
158
 during the worst period of the Great Depression, to 
assist in the restructuring of large public corporations with complicated public debt structures. 
Prior to its enactment, companies in financial trouble could only turn to the Bankruptcy Act of 
1919.
159
  The Bankruptcy Act, however, did not apply to secured creditors and the debtor had to 
be bankrupt. Furthermore, the Act did not allow for a stay of proceedings before a proposal was 
filed.
160
  These were the primary reasons for enacting the CCAA in 1933. Parliament recognized 
that the requirement that a company must be bankrupt before it can make a proposal was very 
harsh, particularly during the Depression.  As the Honourable Charles H. Cahan pointed out in 
the House of Commons: 
At the present time, some legal method of making arrangements and 
compromises between creditors and companies is perhaps more 
necessary because of the prevailing commercial and industrial 
depression, and it was thought by the government that we should adopt 
some method whereby compromises might be carried into effect under 
the supervision of the courts without utterly destroying the company or 
its organization, without loss of good-will and without forcing the 
improvident sale of its assets.
 161
 
In 1953 amendments were made to the CCAA through An Act to amend the Companies’ 
Creditors Arrangement Act 1933.
162
  These amendments emphasized the importance of the 
CCAA being a statute for large corporations only and added a provision restricting its use to 
debtors having issued bonds or debentures under a trust deed. 
163
  Not only did this provision 
ensure that only large corporations with complex financial structures could apply under the 
CCAA, but it also more adequately protected unsecured creditors.  The requirement of a trust 
deed provided for a trustee of the creditors who looked after their interests.
164
  The need to 
protect unsecured creditors arose because between 1933 and 1953 many debtors were using false 
or misleading statements to induce unsecured creditors to accept arrangements.  Equally as 
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important was the fact that the amendments kept the CCAA at only 22 sections, allowing courts 
to customize reorganizations to each proceeding and adapt to a variety of economic situations. 
In the years following the enactment of the 1953 amendments, the CCAA was used less 
often; receivership and liquidation were used much more than reorganization.  In the late 1980s, 
however, the CCAA was rediscovered by the legal community.  Another recession had hit 
Canada and counsel for debtor companies once again turned to the CCAA to avoid having their 
clients enter bankruptcy.
165
  In 1990, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a debtor to issue 
“instant” bonds or debentures and appoint a nominal trustee to satisfy the statutory 
requirements.
166
   
 The skeletal nature of the CCAA allowed courts to interpret the legislation liberally and 
progressively,
167
 which the legal community preferred over the rule-driven BIA.
168
 The courts 
began by applying the idea of inherent jurisdiction to invoke remedies under the CCAA, such as 
extending the stay of proceedings, to allow companies more time to reorganize their company.
 
 
However, many years later, the Supreme Court of Canada held that judicial authority was better 
explained on the basis of statutory interpretation and gap-filling.
169
   By the late 1990s a number 
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of factors, including another economic recession and pressure from the legal community, led to 
further amendments to the Act. In 1997, An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act was passed.170  A monetary 
threshold had become necessary as many small companies were issuing instant trust deeds in 
order to qualify for CCAA protection.
171
 Parliament removed the requirement for a trust deed 
and instead established a monetary threshold such that the total claims against the debtor must 
exceed five million dollars.
172
   Justice Farley commented on the threshold criterion of five 
million dollars, and stated that:  
[w]hile this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the 
practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative 
costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other 
parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when 
viewed from the perspective of $5 million.  These costs would be 
prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time 
horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of 
a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible 
extensions) whereas under [the] CCAA, the length is in the discretion of 
the court, judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the 
circumstances of the case.  Certainly sooner is better than later.  
However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which 
proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently 
exceed a year.
173
 
Other amendments included the introduction of a court-appointed monitor to oversee the 
business and financial affairs of the company,
174
 a provision that allows the debtor to 
compromise claims against directors that arose prior to the commencement of proceedings,
175
 a 
provision limiting the court’s initial stay order to thirty days and requiring a hearing to extend 
that time,
176
 and the enactment of international insolvency provisions.
177
 
                                                                                                                                                             
assert an inherent jurisdiction.  Hence, inherent jurisdiction continues to be a valuable tool, but not one that is 
necessary to utilize in most circumstances. 
170
 S.C. 1997, c.12 
171
 Supra note 166. 
172
 CCAA s.3(1). 
173
 Stelco Inc., Re,  2004 CarswellOnt 1211 at para 19, 48 C.B.R. (4
th
) 299  (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], leave to 
appeal refused (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont.C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter Stelco].  
174
 CCAA s. 11.7(1). 
175
 CCAA s. 5.1. 
176
 CCAA s. 11(3). 
177
 CCAA s. 18.6. 
45 
 
The most recent set of amendments to the CCAA came into force on September 18, 
2009.
178
  The new provisions were made in order to expand the CCAA and bring it more in line 
with the BIA, the United States Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11 and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency and court decisions.  Among some of the more important additions 
is section 11, which provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant priority charges.  This allows 
debtors to borrow funds to restructure and to secure those loans with priority charges over 
existing security on their assets.  This type of financing is known in the United States as “debtor-
in-possession” or “DIP” lending and had previously been used in CCAA proceedings although 
there was no statutory authority for it.  As well, section 11.4 gives the court the ability to declare 
certain suppliers as “critical suppliers”.  The court must be satisfied that the supplier is critical to 
the company’s continuing operations.179  In addition to these sections, sections 44 to 55 of the 
CCAA were enacted to deal with international insolvencies.
180
 The CCAA is an evolving statute 
that often changes when major changes occur in the economy, and has adapted over time to deal 
with contemporary conditions.  Although more sections and guidance were added to the CCAA 
in 2009, it remains a very flexible piece of legislation that can be used in a variety of situations 
including mass tort insolvency restructuring.  
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3.3 Insolvency under the CCAA 
3.3.1 Requirement of Insolvency 
To qualify for CCAA protection, a company must be a “debtor company” as defined in the 
Act and have in excess of $5 million in claims against it.
181
  Section 2(1) of the CCAA defines a 
“debtor company” as any company that: 
(a) is bankrupt or insolvent, 
(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is deemed insolvent within the 
meaning of the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, whether or not 
proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of 
those Acts, 
(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy 
order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or 
(d) is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and 
Restructuring Act because the company is insolvent; 
 
According to this section, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent in order to be able to use the 
CCAA.
182
  The CCAA, however, does not define “insolvent”.  This deficiency has resulted in the 
development of inconsistent jurisprudence.   
 
3.3.2 Definition of Insolvency in the Context of the CCAA 
In many situations, proving insolvency is relatively simple.  All a company needs to do is 
show proof of contractual obligations in excess of $5 million that it is unable to pay.  When 
dealing with mass torts, proving insolvency is much more difficult.  If most of the claims against 
the company are personal injuries that the company has allegedly caused because of negligent 
design, distribution, manufacture or failure to warn of their faulty product, many claims will not 
be reduced to judgment or may not have manifest themselves as of the date of the debtor’s 
                                                 
181
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application   Since “insolvent” is not defined in the CCAA, the BIA definition of “insolvent 
person” has commonly been used by courts.183   Section 2 of the BIA states that “insolvent 
person”: 
means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business 
or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as 
claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and 
(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally 
become due, 
(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course 
of business as they generally become due, or 
(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at fair valuation, sufficient, or 
if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be 
sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due. 
 
Subsection 2(1)(a) of the CCAA defines “debtor company” as any company that is 
“bankrupt or insolvent.”  It does not specifically refer to the BIA or the Winding-Up and 
Restructuring Act, as (b), (c) and (d) do.  According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell 
Express Vu Limited Partnership v. Rex,
184
 when interpreting a statute “the words of an Act are to 
be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the 
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.185  This approach 
recognizes “the important role that context must inevitably play”186 when the written words of a 
statute are interpreted by a court. Any ambiguity must be “real” and “reasonably capable of more 
than one meaning”.187  The entire context of a provision must be looked at before coming to the 
conclusion of ambiguity or multiple meanings.  The Court goes on to deal with ambiguity and 
states that: 
ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that several courts – or, for that 
matter, several doctrinal writers – have come to differing conclusions on 
the interpretation of a given provision...it is necessary for the court 
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charged with interpreting a provision to undertake the contextual and 
purposive approach...to determine if ‘the words are ambiguous enough to 
induce two people to spend good money in backing two opposing views 
as to their meaning’.188 
The definition of “debtor company,” when examined grammatically in its ordinary sense 
and in its entirety is not ambiguous.   Had Parliament intended to have the courts refer to the 
BIA, it would have specifically stated in subsection (a) that the debtor was to be bankrupt or 
insolvent within the meaning of the BIA, as it did for section 2(1)(b) and (c).  Furthermore, each 
of the clauses of subsection 2(1) are divided by semicolons and an “or” making it clear that each 
subsection is separate and distinct.  Accordingly, in section 2(1)(a) of the CCAA, “bankrupt or 
insolvent,” is not tied to the definition of insolvency in the BIA. 
In order to determine what “insolvent” means in the context of the CCAA, it is necessary 
to examine the object of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. According to the preamble 
of the CCAA, it is “[a]n Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and 
their creditor.”189  In Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.190 Justice Farley expanded on the 
intention of Parliament by stating: 
[t]he CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements 
between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy 
and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation.  It 
seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent 
companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal 
with their assets so as to enable a plan of compromise or arrangement to 
be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court.  In the 
interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make an order so 
as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent 
company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the 
proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both 
the company and its creditors.
191
   
 
Justice Blair in Re Canadian Red Cross Society
192
 adopted Justice Farley’s explanation of the 
intention of the CCAA and stated that:  
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[t]he CCAA is designed to be a flexible instrument, and it is that very 
flexibility which gives it its efficacy. As Farley J. said in Dylex, supra 
(p.111), "the history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial 
interpretation". It is not infrequently that judges are told, by those 
opposing a particular initiative at a particular time, that if they make a 
particular order that is requested it will be the first time in Canadian 
jurisprudence (sometimes in global jurisprudence, depending upon the 
level of the rhetoric) that such an order has made! Nonetheless, the orders 
are made, if the circumstances are appropriate and the orders can be 
made within the framework and in the spirit of the CCAA legislation.
193
  
According to the Ontario Court of Appeal in Elan Corp. v. Comiskey
194
 “it is well established 
[that] the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of 
compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both.”195  
The purpose of the CCAA is vastly different from that of the BIA.  The BIA is focused on 
liquidating all of the assets of a corporation and applying the proceeds to the corporation’s debts. 
The purpose of the CCAA is to maintain the financial viability of the corporation through 
negotiation and compromise.  When it comes to the issue of “insolvency” strong arguments can 
be made that the BIA definition should not apply.  Reorganizations take months if not years to 
organize and successfully complete.  The BIA definition of insolvency requires a company to be 
on the verge of bankruptcy and a company so close to bankruptcy would not be able to develop a 
plan and have time to successfully implement it.  The legislation itself appears to favour an 
expanded meaning and unique CCAA-focused definition of “insolvency”.  Nonetheless, courts 
have come to two different conclusions on what definition of “insolvency” should be used in the 
CCAA.  There are some cases that favour a more conservative, BIA-focused definition, while 
others favour a broad and CCAA-focused interpretation of insolvency.   
 
3.3.2.1 Conservative, BIA-focused definition of “insolvency” 
Justice Ground in Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.
196
 took a 
conservative approach in defining insolvency under the CCAA. Enterprise (a creditor of Semi-
Tech) applied for an order declaring that Semi-Tech was a corporation to which the CCAA 
applied.  The Court held that section 2 of the BIA was to be used to determine insolvency in the 
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CCAA and found that Semi-Tech was not ‘insolvent’ as that term is defined in the BIA.197  
Justice Ground noted that the BIA definition of insolvency applied, but stated that the courts 
must be aware of the purpose and intent of the CCAA, which was an “alternative to bankruptcy 
or liquidation of companies in financial difficulties”.198 He went on to state that the CCAA was 
meant to have a court sanction plans of arrangement between companies and their creditors, 
thereby permitting “a restructuring and the continued operation of the companies’ businesses and 
continued production and employment by the companies.”199  Although Justice Ground 
acknowledged that the CCAA was meant to continue businesses rather than end them, he held 
that Semi-Tech was not “insolvent”, but solvent.  He took into account only obligations currently 
payable or properly chargeable in an accounting period, rather than looking further into the 
future and assessing whether those obligations could be met.   
A similar approach was taken in Re Les Oblats de Marie Immaculee du Manitoba.
200
  The 
Crown applied to set aside a stay granted to Les Oblats to have the approval of their amended 
proposed plan postponed until the Supreme Court of Canada decided what they believed to be a 
related case.  The members of Les Oblats were primarily retired priests who were alleged to have 
abused former students.  Justice Schwartz stated that in order for Les Oblats to come within the 
jurisdiction of the CCAA it must establish that it is a “debtor company” under section 2(1) of the 
CCAA and the only way to do so was to establish that it was insolvent.  The court concluded that 
the definition of “insolvent person” in the BIA was “not only a useful guide but is the only 
appropriate definition.”201  The court held that Les Oblats was not insolvent and did not allow 
them to receive CCAA protection.  The claims against Les Oblats were only possible, not 
probable. In both Semi-Tech and Les Oblats the courts applied the BIA definition and focused on 
the obligations that were currently payable and provable. 
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3.3.2.2 Broad definition of insolvency 
In an earlier case, Justice Farley in Re Inducon Development Corp.
202
 applied a different 
approach than that in Semi-Tech and Les Oblats.  In this case, a company, Inducon Development 
Corp. and its subsidiary, applied for approval of a plan under the CCAA.  Justice Farley held that 
they both met the threshold of the CCAA test:  
namely both are insolvent; they have trust deeds with debentures 
outstanding (while to a degree they may be termed “instant debentures”, 
the subscription money apparently is in the bank accounts of the 
companies); and there is a general proposal that there would be a 
compromise or arrangement between the companies and their creditors, 
including debenture holders, which would involve distress preferred 
shares and interest deferral.
203
  
Although he did not delve into the issue or definition of “insolvent,” he stated that the CCAA is 
“designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative.  The CCAA should not 
be the last gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a 
stage prior to the death throe”.204  In other words, the company should be in financial distress, 
but not on the brink of bankruptcy.  Justice Farley focused on the intent of the CCAA and 
applied it to determine insolvency.   
The Red Cross case arose almost a decade after Inducon Development Corp. and although 
the definition of “insolvent” was not specifically discussed in the Court granted it CCAA 
protection.  Justice Blair said that:  
Recognizing that its potential liabilities far outstripped its assets and 
abilities to meet those liabilities, and hoping as well to save the important 
non-blood related aspects of its operations, the Red Cross applied to this 
Court for protection under the CCAA in July, 1988.
205
 
There were approximately $8 billion of tort claims asserted against the Red Cross when it 
applied for protection.  Although the reasoning for finding the Red Cross insolvent was never 
provided in any reported cases, the Crown in Les Oblats, however, stated that the unsecured 
trade debts of the Red Cross were approximately “$30,000,000.00 combined with its money 
losing operation[,] while operating the national blood system[,] [is what] brought it to the verge 
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of exhausting its cash flow [and therefore] the motions judge ... conclude[d] it was insolvent.”206 
Justice Schwartz in Les Oblats stated that the final order in the Red Cross case “was arrived at by 
consensus with no continued objection”.207  When the Court in Red Cross was approving the 
reorganizational Plan, Justice Blair stated, that “the Court has already ruled that the Red Cross is 
a debtor corporation entitled to the protection of the CCAA, and I am satisfied that all of the 
statutory requirements of the Act have been complied with.”208  It appears that the tort claims 
were likely taken into account when determining that the Red Cross was insolvent.  
 Justice Farley examined the issue of insolvency within the meaning of the CCAA in detail 
in Re Stelco Inc.
209
  Stelco dealt with a motion, made by the union representing many of Stelco’s 
workers, to have an initial order under the CCAA rescinded on the basis that Stelco was not a 
“debtor company” under section 2(1) of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.  As “insolvent” 
is not defined in the CCAA, Justice Farley referred to the definition of “insolvent person” in the 
BIA.  According to Justice Farley, CCAA proceedings are much more relaxed than other 
proceedings and they “are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in 
our courtrooms”.210  Justice Farley went on to state: 
insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the 
BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA...[t]he BIA 
definition would appear to have been historically focused on the question 
of bankruptcy – and not reorganization...[t]he BIA definition then was 
essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the “end” situation 
...[r]eorganization under a plan or proposal...is with a general objective of 
the applicant continuing to exist...
211
  
Justice Farley concluded that because of the time and steps involved in reorganizing a company, 
the meaning of insolvency should be expanded under the CCAA in order “to give effect to the 
rehabilitative goal of the Act”.212  There would be no point in having restructuring legislation if 
debtor companies had to wait until they were in dire financial difficulties before they could apply 
for CCAA protection.  Such companies would not have the financial resources to successfully 
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make it through to the end of the reorganization.
213
  Justice Farley stated that the test under the 
CCAA must be different from that under the BIA in order to “meet the special circumstances and 
objectives of the CCAA”.214  He held that the CCAA test for insolvency should be the BIA 
definition of” insolvent person”, “... with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled 
corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable 
proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a 
restructuring”.215   
Section 2 of the BIA defines “insolvent person” as someone who is “for any reason unable 
to meet his obligations as they generally become due”.216  Justice Farley states that this section 
“speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past”.217  He concluded that Stelco was an 
“insolvent person” because “it placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the 
obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate 
future”.218 He also noted that Stelco would have a liquidity problem in nine or ten months and 
that there was very little chance that Stelco would receive any further funding.  When dealing 
with the issue of whether using the BIA definition is appropriate he stated:  
It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my 
question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on 
a prospective basis being answered “24 hours”) then Stelco would not be 
insolvent under that test.  However, I am of the view that that would be 
unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to 
be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under 
BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the 
time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or 
crisis which will result in the applicant running out of “cash” to pay its 
debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of 
the stay and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization 
pursuant to an order.  I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of 
BIA (a) test in the context of reorganization or “rescue” as opposed to a 
threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences 
proceeding.  On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of 
filing.  Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) 
test clearly for the reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of 
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“insolvent” within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue 
solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity 
crisis would occur in the sense of running out of “cash” but for the grant 
of the CCAA order.  On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its 
limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn 
recently experienced and anticipated.
219
  
The Court also found that Stelco failed section 2(c) of the BIA definition of “insolvent 
person,” which is referred to as “an assets compared to obligations test.”220 In order to be 
considered insolvent under this part of the test, it must be determined that “the aggregate of [a 
company’s] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted 
sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [the company’s] 
obligations, due and accruing.”221 Justice Farley held that “obligations, due and accruing due” 
include all obligations of whatever nature and kind without leaving anything behind.  The union 
had argued that under the Court’s definition many companies would technically be insolvent.  
The Court pointed out that it has the discretion not to grant CCAA relief or to terminate relief 
already granted.  As Justice Farley explained, if Stelco were to cease paying its pre-filing debts, 
it would be considered game playing, and in his view Stelco:  
would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such 
an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the 
procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable 
need, then such ought not to be granted.  However, I would point out that 
if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a 
creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process 
(including likely the ouster of management including directors who 
authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the 
corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it 
is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial 
discretion.
222
 
Applying the test of section 2(c) of the BIA, Farley J. found Stelco insolvent and allowed it to 
apply for CCAA protection.   
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Several cases have adopted Stelco’s expanded definition of insolvent in the CCAA, 
including ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.
223
  This case 
differed from Stelco in so far as it was a creditor-driven application under the CCAA, and the 
creditor argued that the respondents/debtors were insolvent because they were unable to satisfy 
their liabilities as they became due.  When dealing with whether the company was “insolvent”, 
the court accepted the test in Stelco, with respect to being “reasonably expected to run out of 
liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to 
implement a restructuring”.224  The Court found that, based on the materials filed, the 
respondents were unable to meet their liabilities and therefore granted CCAA protection.   
 
3.3.2.3  Summary of the CCAA Definition of Insolvency 
There is no judicial consensus as to what constitutes “insolvency” in section 2(1)(a) of the 
CCAA.  Stelco, and other cases that have followed the Stelco decision, have focused on the 
purpose of the CCAA and have attempted to interpret “insolvent” within the context of the 
policy basis for the CCAA.  Justice Farley in Stelco expanded the meaning in order to facilitate a 
company’s reorganization and give effect to the rehabilitative goal of the CCAA.  In the BIA, 
insolvency “is a precondition to the ‘end’ situation of bankruptcy,”225 whereas in the CCAA it is 
“a precondition to entry to a rehabilitative process.”226  
The decision in Stelco was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and in 2004 the leave 
to appeal was refused.  It cannot be assumed that the Stelco approach has been accepted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada and will be followed by the courts.  The Supreme Court has never 
specifically dealt with the issue of “insolvency” in the context of the CCAA to confirm that this 
approach should be used in all CCAA filings; it simply denied leave to appeal.  The CCAA was 
amended in September 2009 and Parliament did not expand the meaning of “insolvency” in s. 
2(1) of the CCAA.  As the Supreme Court of Canada and Parliament have not dealt with this 
issue, it is necessary to focus on the language of the CCAA which provides a great deal of 
judicial discretion in each case in order to achieve successful reorganizations. This should be 
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paramount in deciding how “insolvent” should be defined.   In order to help a company 
reorganize, the need for flexible legislation is vital to successfully reorganize companies as each 
company and their financial structures and issues are all unique.   
This is not to say that there should not be any parameters to the definition of insolvency in 
the context of the CCAA or that the necessity of insolvency be eliminated as has been done 
legislatively in the United States.  It is important that the facts of each particular case be 
examined.  In particular a judge needs to determine if the company is experiencing extreme 
financial distress and currently running out of liquidity, is financially struggling and in the 
foreseeable future will have very little funds remaining.  A company experiencing extreme 
financial distress will not have enough time to successfully restructure under the CCAA.  It could 
take six months or more to in order to reorganize under the CCAA, depending on the complexity 
of the case.  There is no role for CCAA protection of companies that are not experiencing 
financial distress.  CCAA proceedings are expensive and time consuming and, if a company has 
enough resources to deal with its financial situation outside of CCAA proceedings, it is in its 
interest to do so. In any event, it is likely unconstitutional to apply in this situation a federal 
statutory regime based on the jurisdiction of Parliament over insolvency.
227
   If a company’s 
financial situation is a few months away from reaching the critical point and it could make it 
through reorganization but not survive without CCAA protection, it should be awarded CCAA 
protection.  A company must be experiencing financial difficulty but needs to be able to get 
through the reorganization.  This is where the CCAA’s flexibility is important and judicial 
discretion is required.   
Having an expansive meaning of “insolvency” in the CCAA assists companies facing mass 
tort claims. A company can apply to the CCAA when it is experiencing actual financial 
difficulties because it is defending itself from numerous claims or class actions but has not run 
out of liquidity.  The expansive definition allows a company to reorganize before it is completely 
out of funds.  A company can therefore pay out many more, if not all, claims that exist, rather 
than the limited number that would be paid out by liquidation.   
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3.4  Stay of Proceedings 
On July 20, 1998, Justice Blair made an initial order that the Red Cross was a company to 
which the CCAA applied.  Upon so doing, the court ordered a stay of proceedings for one month, 
staying “any and all proceedings, including, without limitation, suits, actions, extra-judicial 
proceedings, enforcement processes or other remedies ... commenced, taken or proceeded with or 
that may be commenced, taken or proceeded with by any of the Applicant’s creditors, suppliers, 
contractors, lenders, customs brokers, landlords...”228 
Under section 11.02 of the CCAA a court may, upon the initial application of a debtor 
company, make an order to stay proceedings. The order will stay all proceedings taken, that 
might be taken and restrain further proceedings in actions proceeding against a company.  
According to section 11.02(1) of the CCAA the initial order can only be effective for no more 
than 30 days.  The stay can be extended according to section 11.02(2) of the CCAA for as long 
as a court deems necessary.  Unlike in the United States, under the CCAA the stay is not 
automatic.  According to section 11.02(3), the court will not make an order to stay proceedings 
unless the company satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate.  
The company must also prove to the court that it has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with 
due diligence. 
The purpose of the stay is to preclude the exercise of collection remedies and other 
measures against the assets of the company while the company prepares a reorganization 
proposal. Section 11.02 gives the Court broad powers to not only stay current proceedings, 
restrain further proceedings (protecting a debtor in the case of defaulting on a contract and 
accelerating a payment, or preventing a third party from relying on a breach of contract to 
terminate an arrangement)
229
 but it can also prohibit commencement of any other actions or suits, 
thereby allowing the company to focus on reorganization.
230
  Although the stay is not automatic, 
the court has the power to provide the debtor with the needed protection and the ability to extend 
it for as long as necessary in order to allow the creditor with the opportunity to develop a plan 
and present it to the creditors.    
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3.5  Monitor 
Subsection 11.7(1) of the CCAA provides for the appointment of a monitor in every 
CCAA proceeding.  The court must appoint the monitor at the same time the initial order is 
made.  The monitor watches over the business and financial affairs of the company and reports to 
the court if there are any adverse changes in the debtor’s financial status.  The monitor’s duties 
and functions are set out in section 23 of the CCAA.  The monitor must act honestly and in good 
faith
231
 and must take care in preparing reports.  The monitor at no time takes possession of the 
debtor company or takes over management of the company.   According to the 2005 amendments 
to the CCAA, the monitor must be a licensed trustee and have training in the area and the 
monitor’s conduct is subject to review of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.   Section 11.7(3)(d) 
of the CCAA provides the court with the powers to order the monitor “to carry out such other 
functions in relation to the company as the court may direct.”232  Many initial orders have a 
number of provisions dealing with the power and duties of the monitor.   
 An example of this is in the Red Cross case where, a monitor, Ernst & Young Inc., was 
appointed when the initial order was made on July 20, 1998.  The court gave the monitor access 
to the debtor`s books, records and assets.  The court also gave the monitor additional duties and 
they were as follows: 
(a) assist the Applicant in the development of the Plan and any 
amendments to and the implementation of the Plan; 
(b) assist the Applicant which the holding including to assist in the 
development of a Plan and any amendments to and the implementation of 
it, to assist in holding and administering any meetings for voting on the 
Plan, and to act as chair to those meetings.   
(c) inquire into and report to creditors, at or prior to any meetings to 
consider the Plan, upon the financial condition and prospects of the 
Applicant; 
(d) be at liberty to engage legal counsel, in the event the Monitor requires 
independent legal advice concerning a specific issue or issues relating to 
the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its obligations under this 
Order, and engage such other agents as the Monitor deems necessary 
respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations 
under this Order; 
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(e) report to this Court as the Monitor deems appropriate or as this Court 
may from time to time direct, in respect of the Plan or the activities or 
affairs of the Applicant or in respect of such other matters as may be 
relevant to the proceedings herein; 
(f) assist the Applicant in preparing such periodic information for the 
Bank as may be required from time to time under the Term Sheet; and 
(g) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or as may be 
required by further order of this Court from time to time.
233
 
 
3.6  Claims 
It is necessary to examine the CCAA and case law to determine which, if any of the mass 
tort claims, including ones that have yet to manifest themselves, fall under the definition of 
“claim” so as to be included in the CCAA reorganization. The CCAA defines “claim” in section 
2(1) as meaning “any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that would be a claim 
provable within the meaning of section 2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.”  In section 2 of 
the BIA a “claim provable in bankruptcy”, “provable claim” or “claim provable” is defined as 
including “any claim or liability provable in proceedings under [the BIA] by a creditor”.  Section 
121 of the BIA states that claims provable are:  
(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is 
subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which 
the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt’s discharge by 
reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt 
becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings 
under this Act.  
(2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a 
provable claim and the valuation of such a claim shall be made in 
accordance with section 135.  
(3) A creditor may prove a debt not payable at the date of the bankruptcy 
and may receive dividends equally with the other creditors, deducting 
only thereout a rebate of interest at the rate of five per cent per annum 
computed from the declaration of a dividend to the time when the debt 
would have become payable according to the terms on which it was 
contracted. 
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The CCAA amendments that came into force on September 18, 2009 included Section 19, 
which is very similar to s.121 of the BIA, but focuses specifically on claims that may be dealt 
with by a compromise or arrangement. However, the amendments do not provide a specific 
definition of the term “claim” but rather prescribe when a claim comes into existence.  Section 
19 states: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the only claims that may be dealt with by a 
compromise or arrangement in respect of a debtor company are 
(a) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the 
company is subject on the earlier of 
(i) the day on which proceedings commenced under this Act, and 
(ii) if the company filed a notice of intention under section 50.4 of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or commenced proceedings under this 
Act with the consent of inspectors referred to in section 116 of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the date of the initial bankruptcy event 
within the meaning of section 2 of that Act; and 
(b) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the 
company may become subject before the compromise or arrangement is 
sanctioned by reason of any obligation incurred by the company before 
the earlier of the days referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii). 
 
In Red Cross, “claim” was defined in an Order establishing a claims procedure as: 
any right of any Person against the Society in connection with any 
indebtedness, liability, lien or obligation of the Society, whether 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present, future, known 
or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such 
right is executor in nature, including without limitation the right or ability 
of any person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or 
otherwise with respect to any matter, action cause or chose in action.
234
 
 
The Red Cross used a very broad, all-encompassing definition of “claim” that allowed it to 
include as many claims as possible into the reorganization. 
 There are potentially seven separate types of claims in an application made by a company 
facing mass tort claims: 1. claims represented by judgments;  2. claims represented by judgments 
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but where the amount of damage has not yet been determined by a court; 3 claims of an 
identified group of people with manifest injuries;  4.  “claims” of a group of unknown people that 
have not yet been the basis of an action; 5. contingent claims; 6. future claims; and 7. post-
petition claims.  Each of these types of claims will be examined in detail on whether or not they 
are considered valid claims for the purpose of the CCAA. 
 
3.6.1 Claims represented by judgments 
In order for claimants with judgment to be allowed to take part in the CCAA process they 
must have a provable claim
235
 and the company must be subject to it on the day on which 
proceedings were commenced.
236
  In this type of claim an injured party has gone through court 
proceedings, has received a judgment and the court has valued the claim prior to the debtor 
commencing CCAA proceedings. Claimants with judgments not only have valid proof that they 
have received an injury due to the company’s negligence, but their claims have also been 
quantified by a court, therefore making them proved claims. As a result of section 2(1) and 
section 19 of the CCAA, it is clear that a claim represented by a judgment and quantified by a 
court prior to proceedings being commenced or prior to the compromise or arrangement being 
sanctioned is a valid claim under CCAA proceedings and will be included in the CCAA process.   
 
3.6.2 Claims represented by judgments where the amount of damage has not been 
determined by a court. 
As in the United States, Canadian law recognizes this category of claims as unliquidated 
claims.  Section 2(1) of the CCAA defines “claim” as including a claim “provable” within the 
meaning of section 2 of the BIA.  Section 2 of the BIA ties in section 121(2) which specifically 
states that an unliquidated claim is a provable claim.  Unliquidated claims occur when the claim 
exists and is provable but the amount of the claim must still be determined.  According to the 
English High Court in Re A Debtor,
237
 “[i]f the ascertainment of a sum of money, even though it 
be specified or named as a definite figure, requires investigation beyond mere arithmetical 
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calculation, then the claim is an unliquidated claim”.238 The claim has already been proved and 
only the valuation of it remains.  It was held in Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank
 239
 that an 
unliquidated claim is provable in bankruptcy and is considered a claim in CCAA proceedings.   
An unliquidated claim does not need to be reduced to an amount to be considered a valid 
claim in bankruptcy and therefore will be included in the CCAA as a valid claim.  As long as the 
claim is reduced to a dollar amount prior to distribution, the claim is within the CCAA.  Section 
20(1)(a)(iii) of the CCAA specifically deals with determining the amount of a claim.  If it is not 
admitted by the company, the amount is to be determined by the court on summary application 
by the company or the creditor.  Section 20(2) of the CCAA allows debtor companies to admit 
claims for voting purposes but also allows them to reserve the right to contest liability on the 
claims for the purposes of distribution. 
In Red Cross, once claimants filed proofs of claim, the claims were examined by the 
Monitor and the Red Cross and then were either accepted, rejected or modified for voting 
purposes pursuant to section 20(2) of the CCAA.  All tort claimants had to show that they were 
exposed to the blood and had HIV, CJD or Hepatitis C. The information in the claim was 
crosschecked with documentation that was available to the Society with respect to the claimant 
receiving the tainted blood. All claims that were accepted were given the value of $1.00 for 
voting purposes.  If the proof of claim was not filed by the set submission date, or it was rejected, 
the claimant was not entitled to vote on the Plan but the Court did not take away his or her right 
to participate pursuant to the Plan.  The claimant was still eligible to receive a distribution if the 
Plan was approved.
240
  After the plan has been accepted, a final value will be determined either 
by agreement between the company and the claimant or by a court through summary application.  
 
3.6.3 Claims of identified claimants whose injuries have manifested but who may or may 
not have brought action 
Another group of claims that may arise in mass tort insolvency cases are those of claimants 
who have begun actions in court but the action has not been heard or claimants who are known to 
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the company as having suffered an injury but have not commenced an action prior to the date of 
petition.  In general these are claimants with manifested injuries.  If these claims are provable, 
the monitor will value each one of them.
241
 In order to determine if these claims constitute a 
“claim” in the CCAA, the definition of “claim” under section 2 of the CCAA and “claim 
provable” in the BIA must be examined.242 The language used in the definition of “claim” in 
section 2 of the CCAA refers to “any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind.” The word 
“debt” has not been defined in either the BIA or the CCAA but it has been examined by the 
courts and has been defined as “a sum payable in respect of a liquidated money demand, 
recoverable by action”.243  It has also been defined as “that which is owed by one person to 
another, and particularly money payable arising from and by reason of a prior promise or 
contract, but also from and by reason of any other ground of obligation.
244
 The word “liability” is 
also very broad and has been defined as including “all obligations to which the bankrupt is 
subject on the day on which he or she becomes bankrupt.”245  
The word “obligation” has also been examined by the courts.  Justice Judson in Smith v. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp.
246
 dealt with the phrase “any obligation incurred” and held that 
the meaning of the word “obligation” should not be restricted to a duty arising out of contract.  
He held that the word “obligation” included “a duty or liability arising from an actionable 
tort”.247  The courts have also dealt with obligations in the context of “due and accruing due”.  In 
Barsi v. Farcas
248
 it was held that “an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, 
but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation.” 249 Re Stelco Inc.250 also dealt with the 
issue of obligations “due and accruing due”. Justice Farley stated: “It seems to me that the 
intention of ‘due and accruing due’ was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind 
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and leave nothing in limbo.”251 He held “obligations” is a much broader term than debts.  
According to the foregoing definitions, a claimant who received an injury from a product that the 
debtor produced or distributed complies with the definition of “claim” in the CCAA. 252 
Next it must be determined if the claim is provable.  The BIA and CCAA do not go into 
detail on what kind of proof is required.  The lack of detail is a necessary part of the CCAA 
process, as every reorganization is unique and the types of claims involved vary considerably.  
The only limit the CCAA has placed on proving claims is that they must arise prior to the day on 
which proceedings were commenced. The corporation and the monitor will determine what type 
of proof is required in each individual case.  The corporation will apply to the court for the 
issuance of a claims procedure order, which establishes the process which will be used to 
determine creditor claims and how disputed claims will be dealt with.  A proof-of-claim package 
is sent out to the claimants outlining what information the company/monitor requires to be 
included.  Known claimants whose injuries have manifest pre-petition should require some sort 
of proof of exposure to the debtor’s product and that the injury was caused by exposure to the 
product.
253
  As long as the claimant can show a connection between their injuries and the 
debtor’s product, in most cases a doctor’s report, the claims will be considered provable claims.   
However, in order for a claimant to receive any payment under a proposal, the claim must 
be valued so as to become a proved claim. Similar to claims under section 2, the amount of 
damage must still be determined and therefore they are considered to be unliquidated claims.  
The BIA states that the valuation of an unliquidated claim shall be made in accordance with 
section 135. Section 135(1.1) states that:  “[t]he trustee shall ... value it, and the claim is 
thereafter, subject to this section...deemed a proved claim to the amount of its valuation.”  
Section 20 of the CCAA deals with how the court is to determine the value of each claim.  
Section 20(2) states that a company may admit the amount of a claim for voting purposes and 
reserve a right to contest liability for other purposes.  Although the BIA and CCAA sections are 
similar, the purpose of the CCAA is that the company will continue to exist as opposed to ending 
it like the BIA. Consequently, under the CCAA the debtor must develop a plan that provides for 
the payout of creditors and the continuation of its business (the completion of the reorganization 
may take years).  If a debtor/monitor does not accept the claimant’s proof for the value of the 
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claim, according to section 20(1)(iii) of the CCAA the amount will be determined by the court 
on summary application by the company or the creditor. Once a value is placed on the claim, 
either by the debtor/monitor or by a court, it is deemed a proved claim to the amount of its 
valuation.
254
   
 
3.6.4 Unknown Claimants 
The circumstances may be such that there are persons, unknown to the company at the date 
the proceedings are invoked, who have claims.  They have suffered injuries but have not filed 
claims.  The court in Red Cross allowed these types of claims in the reorganization by including 
two class action claims in the Plan.  One of these class action claims was Killough v. Canadian 
Red Cross Society,
255
 where a class action was commenced against the Red Cross and the 
government of British Columbia for damages arising out of the supply of blood and blood 
products before January 1, 1986 and between July 1, 1990 and September 28, 1998, which was 
contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus.
256
  The class action was certified as a class action on 
November 24, 1998, but all proceedings against the Red Cross had been stayed by the CCAA 
order issued on July 29, 1998. Red Cross offered the members of this and the parallel class 
actions a settlement that was then included in the CCAA Plan.
257
  The class was broad and 
included all people who became infected with the Hepatitis C virus as a result of receiving blood 
or blood derivatives or blood products collected or supplied by the Red Cross, all people who 
became infected with the Hepatitis C virus as a result of contact with a person who had Hepatitis 
C and had received blood from the Red Cross in the prescribed period and all people with 
derivative claims.
258
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3.6.5  Contingent Claims 
Claimants who are known to have been exposed to the debtor’s product but whose injuries 
have not manifested as of the petition date are considered to hold contingent claims.  A 
contingent claim is defined as a debt that has not accrued; more specifically, it may or may not 
ever ripen into a debt and depends on some future event that may or may not happen.
259
  
Contingent claims can be a large part of mass tort cases if the product involved does not cause an 
injury upon exposure and has a long latency period.  The CCAA does not specifically deal with 
contingent claims.  Therefore the general definition of “claim” must be examined to determine if 
these claims can be included in the CCAA proceedings.   
The general definition of “claim” in CCAA section 2(1), refers to claims as any 
“indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind” that would be a claim provable under section 2 
of the BIA.  Section 121(2) of the BIA specifically deals with contingent claims and states that 
the trustee shall determine if they are provable. If they are found to be provable, according to 
section 135 of the BIA, the trustee shall thereafter value them and at that point the claim is 
deemed a proved claim. Section 19 of the CCAA is similar to section 121 of the BIA and states 
that claims that relate to debts, “present or future” must come into existence prior to proceedings 
commencing and section 20 states that the amount of the claim shall be admitted by the company 
or determined by summary application.  Therefore in order for a claim to be provable, it must be 
in existence at the time or before proceedings were commenced, or the debtor must become 
subject to it before his discharge by an obligation incurred before the proceedings were 
commenced.   
Even though the CCAA does not refer specifically to contingent claims, section 19 refers 
to “future liability”.  It was once believed that contingent claims were not included in the 
CCAA.
260
  The legislation was reworded and cases held that contingent claims were provable 
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under the CCAA.  The 2009 amendments to the CCAA codified contingent claims as “provable” 
claims through section 19 which states that “claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or 
future” will be dealt with in a compromise or arrangement but the company must become subject 
to it on the day proceedings commence or before the arrangement or compromise is 
sanctioned.
261
   
In tort law an “action normally becomes enforceable from the date of injury or loss or 
when the damage manifests itself or becomes quantifiable as to its extent”.262  Therefore, latent 
claims are not usually actionable until the injury and the cause have been discovered by the 
claimant.   In order to determine whether contingent tort claims can be included in the CCAA, 
prior to the manifestation of an injury, section 19 of the CCAA must be examined.  Section 19 
refers to “debt” and “liability”. The word debt is much more narrowly defined than “liability”.263 
“Liability” was defined in Re Laurance264 as “primarily referable to the existence of [an] 
obligation and is not to be confined to the present right to enforce it.”265  Under the CCAA 
claims become actionable on the date on which the debtor owes the claimant an obligation. 
Therefore, with respect to tort injuries, in the CCAA the claim will become actionable on the 
date the claimant purchased or was exposed to the product. It follows that contingent tort claims 
are included under the CCAA as long as the claimant can establish she or he has a provable 
claim even though the injury has yet to occur.  
There are a number of cases that have held that contingent claims are included in the 
CCAA.  For example, in Re Air Canada,
266
 Justice Farley dealt with the issue of contingent 
unliquidated claims under the CCAA.  The Court was deciding whether a pay equity claim that 
was underway before a tribunal was a proved claim.   Justice Farley stated that “[c]ontingent 
unliquidated claims are determined under the CCAA claims process even in the most 
complicated of litigation and even though a claim may not have been actually initiated in a court 
or otherwise.”267 Some evidence from the claimant, an expert report even in simplified form, to 
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support its claim would have been enough evidence that the company would have to respond.  
The claims process under the CCAA does not require that the report/proof be precise. 
Negus v. Oakley’s General Contracting268 dealt with a plaintiff suing the defendant for 
damages for breach of contract and express warranty arising from the improper construction of 
his home.  The Court held that:  
[t]he claims of the plaintiff for damages are contingent, unliquidated 
claims or future liabilities to which the defendants might have become 
subject before their discharge from bankruptcy because of the improper 
work which they carried out with respect to the plaintiff's home before 
the date of the bankruptcy. Moreover, they are recoverable by legal 
process and are not too remote and speculative. Therefore, the claims of 
the plaintiff are deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
269
 
As well, the Court in Menegon v. Philip Services Corp.
270
 held that “for the purposes of the 
CCAA[,] the claim of an unsecured creditor includes a claim in respect of any indebtedness, 
obligation or liability which would be a claim provable in bankruptcy, and ... includes a 
contingent claim for unliquidated damages.”271   
Therefore, according to the case law and the legislation, contingent tort claims are included 
in the CCAA if the claimant can prove exposure to the dangerous product. There are limits. As 
was held in Claude Resources Inc. (Trustee of) v. Dutton
272
 unsecured contingent claims must be 
“provable” in order to be considered a valid claim.  If there are too many “ifs” to a contingent 
claim, the claim is too remote: it is not provable. What type of proof is required depends on the 
product in question. 
For example, in Red Cross, the majority of the tort claims were contingent. Most of the 
claimants were known but many of their injuries had yet to manifest.  In the Order Establishing a 
Claims Procedure, “Claim” was defined as including contingent claims.273  The Order also 
defined “Proven Claim” as meaning “the amount of the Claim of a Creditor [any person having a 
claim] against the Society, for voting purposes only, determined in accordance with the 
provisions....of this Order if a Transfusion Claim, and which has become a Proven Claim 
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pursuant to and as defined in the respective Order, thereby entitling the Creditor to vote in 
respect of the Plan.”274 Proofs of claim were sent out to all known claimants and published in 
newspapers.  The Red Cross with the Monitor reviewed the claims, cross-checked the 
information available to the Red Cross, and decided whether to allow or disallow a claim for 
voting purposes.  In order to receive the right to vote, every claimant was to fill out a form 
stating when they received a blood transfusion and which disease they were infected with along 
with when they were diagnosed and the name of the physician who diagnosed them.  All allowed 
transfusion claims were valued at $1 per claim.
275
  If someone had not filed a claim or their claim 
was disallowed at this stage, the person/claimant could not vote.  
Once a claim is found to be provable, the next step is to value it.  The difficulty in dealing 
with contingent tort claims is valuing them. Some Canadian courts have valued contingent 
claims by determining the likelihood of the contingency happening.
276
  If there is almost a 
complete certainty this claim will arise, they include the full value of the claim; when it is a 
remote possibility, the value is reduced to zero.
277
  In other cases, some courts value the claim 
based on a greater than fifty percent chance of the claim arising, in which case, they will give it 
full value.  If there is less than fifty percent chance of it arising, no value will be given to it.  
Another approach is to value a claim according to the percentage of the likelihood it will 
occur.
278
  Valuing claims this way becomes problematic when the amount of the claim is very 
high but the possibility of it actually occurring is very low.  For example, there is a ten percent 
chance of a $10 million claim arising that would mean they have a claim for $1 million.  This 
would mean most of the assets would go to a claimant whose claim was very unlikely to 
materialize.
279
  It has been decided by many courts that some claims are too remote and 
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speculative and therefore not provable.
280
  The onus is on the creditor to prove a claim.  The 
evidence does not have to be precise but some evidence must be submitted.  Similarly, in Re 
Galaxy Sports Inc.
281
 the Court held a “trustee should look at what is reasonable in the 
circumstances and apply an appropriate contingency in determining the amount at which to value 
the claim.”282  If the valuation occurs before the contingency happens and it is found that the 
value is too low, the creditor can amend his claim as long as it does not disturb the dividend 
already paid.
283
  
In order to include the contingent tort claimants in the Plan, courts in the United States 
have estimated the value of the contingent tort claims and established trusts, by channelling all 
the tort claims to the trust. In Les Oblats, the court stated that future liabilities “might be 
addressed in having the distribution held in trust pending resolution of the claims and then 
divided in appropriate proportions”.284 The first case to do this in Canada was Red Cross.  In this 
case the Court set up trusts that avoided the issue of having to value each claim before the plan 
was sanctioned while allowing the Red Cross to include the tort claims in the reorganization.  
The CCAA does not forbid the setting up of trusts as it allows companies to determine the best 
plan to deal with all of their creditors.  Companies can include tort claims in the CCAA through 
section 20(2).  This section states that a company may admit the amount of a claim for voting 
purposes and reserve the right to contest liability for other purposes.   
 If a claimant had not entered a proof of claim by the claims bar date, they were not entitled 
to vote on the Plan, although they were not excluded from receiving compensation under the 
Plan.  The Plan specifically contained provisions that included all people who were exposed to 
the blood products prior to September 28, 1998 and developed an injury one to ten years 
(depending on the type of injury) after the Plan was approved.  These people could file a claim 
within the time period specified, thereafter have it valued, and then would receive compensation 
from the trust fund based on the findings of the Trustee.  The tort claimants’ only recourse was 
the trust.   
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Courts have appointed representative counsel in many cases by using inherent jurisdiction 
under section 11 of the CCAA to appoint representative counsel, to aid in protecting all creditors 
who cannot represent themselves.
285
  It is important to note that there is a difference between 
representative counsel and representative claims. Representative claims were dealt with in 
Muscletech Research & Development Inc.
286
  This case involved product liability claims for the 
use of the chemical ephedra and prohormones used in dietary supplements that the debtor 
manufactured and sold.  One of the issues the Ontario Superior Court dealt with was whether 
plaintiffs in an uncertified class action could file claims on behalf of themselves and future 
unidentified claims of other similarly situated claimants.  Justice Mesbur stated that “[t]he 
CCAA neither expressly permits nor forbids representative claims.”287  Justice Mesbur examined 
the CCAA and the BIA, and held that the BIA has a mechanism for determining whether a 
contingent or unliquidated claim is provable, which leaves it to the trustee’s discretion to 
determine.  Justice Mesbur concluded that “while it is possible to have a limited representation 
order in CCAA proceedings, it is by no means clear that representation orders have been 
extended to permit a “representative” proof of claim to be filed.”288  The claimants involved in 
the Muscletech case could have turned to the CCAA process as the process adequately protected 
their interests.  It is important to note that although the Red Cross allowed representation orders 
for various groups of claimants, they did not allow for the filing of representative proofs of 
claim.   
After determining which groups required representation, the Red Cross estimated the 
number and amount of damages they would require to put into trust for the tort claimants. Four 
trusts were established, one for CJD claims, one for HCV claims, one for HIV claims and one for 
Other Transfusion claims, all with different claims bar dates.  The fund for the CJD claims was 
to be maintained for 10 years from the Plan implementation date or until the funds were 
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exhausted, whichever occurred first.  During that period any person proving a CJD claim was 
entitled to $10,000.
289
  The HCV trust gave claimants one year from the Plan implementation 
Date to prove to the trustee their injuries, and therefore entitled to an equal share of the fund to a 
maximum of $10,000 each.  The HIV trust provided claimants with four months following the 
Plan Implementation Date to determine their damages.  Damages were to be calculated and if 
they exceeded $10 million dollars were to be reduced pro-rata. Claimants who had not filed a 
claim against the Red Cross by the Plan Implementation Date (October 5, 2001) did not have 
their claims extinguished according to section 5.13(b) of the Plan; instead their rights were 
converted into, or replaced by, rights to receive damages from the HIV fund.
290
   
 
3.6.6 Future Claims  
Future claims of unidentified people are the most difficult types of claims to deal with in 
the CCAA.  These types of claims involve people who are unknown and whose injury does not 
manifest until after the plan is sanctioned.  The courts in Canada have treated contingent claims 
and future claims under the heading “future claims” as both types of claims deal with injuries 
that have not manifest as of the petition date.  There is an important difference between the two.  
When a company is dealing with contingent claims, the claimants are known and only the extent 
of their injuries is unknown.  Whereas in classic future claims, the number of claimants as well 
as their injury is unknown, therefore making them much more complicated and prone to 
estimation errors. As stated earlier, tort claims in the CCAA are determined by when exposure to 
the product took place rather than the manifestation of the injury.  Future claimants may be 
exposed to the product before petition, but will be unknown to the debtor. 
In determining whether classic future claims are considered claims in the CCAA, the 
general definition of “claim” in CCAA section 2(1), refers to claims as any “indebtedness, 
liability or obligation of any kind” that would be a claim provable under section 2 of the BIA.  
Section 121(2) of the BIA specifically includes all debts and liabilities, present and future.  
Section 19 of the CCAA states that the only claims that may be dealt with in a compromise or 
arrangement are claims that relate to debts of liabilities, present or future. The debtor owes these 
people who were exposed to its product an obligation, but the CCAA requires claims to be 
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provable.  As the number of claimants and their injuries are not known, these claims are usually 
very remote and speculative.
291
  
The CCAA “expresses a public policy favouring compromise and consensual restructuring 
over piecemeal liquidation”.292  To have a successful restructuring under the CCAA, all claims 
— secured, under secured, unsecured and contingent — should be dealt with “as part of a 
“controlled stream” of claims that are being negotiated with a view to facilitating a compromise 
and arrangement.  As the case law has shown, it is not clear if the CCAA allows claims of 
unidentified future claimants into the CCAA.   If the debtor developed a product that caused 
injury to people but at the time of the CCAA reorganization, it was not known that the product 
was faulty, these types of claimants could not be included in the CCAA as claimants.  But if the 
debtor, as in Red Cross, knew that the blood products they distributed were tainted prior to its 
application under the CCAA, the debtor could set up a trust that could deal with potential 
unknown claimants and include them in the CCAA. 
Through the use of trusts and representatives (similar to contingent claimants), courts have 
included these claims in the reorganization case.
293
 Appointing representatives allows the 
interests of future claimants to be protected as they cannot be present in the proceedings. Then 
trusts are formed allowing people to file claims against the trust when the claimant becomes 
known and manifests an injury.  Allowing future tort claims in the CCAA is not expressly 
prohibited by the Act. The ATB Financial case
294
 focused on the CCAA and held that judicial 
orders should fit within the framework of the CCAA, and no matter how unique an order is, it 
can be made as long as it assists in producing a successful reorganization.
295
  Including trusts in 
the CCAA plan is a new, but positive, development because they assist companies facing mass 
tort future claims successfully reorganize.  If future tort claims were not included in the 
reorganization, the claimants would bring actions against the company after the reorganization 
was complete.  If the company has not sold all of its assets and has continued to do business, it 
may be forced into bankruptcy by a large number of post-confirmation claims.  If the company 
has sold its assets, the future claimants would have no recourse. 
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Although Red Cross did not distinguish between contingent and future claims, future 
claims were included in the Plan through the tort trusts that were set up to channel all tort claims 
against the Red Cross.  The number of possible claims, the value of those claims and the date the 
claimants should know of their injury were estimated.
296
  The Red Cross also incorporated class 
actions that included future claims into the Plan. Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Society
297
 dealt 
with a class action settlement on behalf of all people who were infected with HCV between 
January 1, 1986 - July 1, 1990. This trust was funded by the federal and provincial and territorial 
governments.  The settlement included future claimants by providing 10 years for people to enter 
claims to receive a fixed payment or “compensation for pain and suffering and loss of amenities 
of life based upon the stage of his or her medical contingent at the time of qualification under the 
Plan...”298 While dealing with future tort claims was not intended by Parliament when enacting 
the CCAA, it has provided a forum to deal with them.
299
  
 
3.6.7 Post-Petition Claims 
These types of claimants include people who were exposed to the debtor’s product after the 
debtor made an application to the CCAA.  Section 19 of the CCAA specifically states that: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the only claims that may be dealt with by a 
compromise or arrangement in respect of a debtor company are 
(a) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the 
company is subject on the earlier of 
(i) the day on which proceedings commenced under this Act, and 
(ii) if the company filed a notice of intention under section 50.4 of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or commenced proceedings under this 
Act with the consent of inspectors referred to in section 116 of the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the date of the initial bankruptcy event 
within the meaning of section 2 of that Act; and 
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(b) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the 
company may become subject before the compromise or arrangement is 
sanctioned by reason of any obligation incurred by the company before 
the earlier of the days referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii). 
The CCAA is very clear that a claim exists only if the obligation was incurred by the company 
before CCAA proceedings are commenced. This was not an issue for the Red Cross case, as all 
claims that were included in the Plan were from people who were exposed to the blood products 
prior to the date of the CCAA application.   
 
3.7  Classes 
Under the CCAA, there are only two general classes of creditors, secured and unsecured.
300
  
Tort claimants are considered unsecured claimants. According to section 22 of the CCAA, the 
debtor may divide each class of creditors into separate classes and apply to the court for approval 
of the division before a meeting is held with respect to the plan.  The debtor must place creditors 
whose rights or interests are sufficiently similar and have a “commonality of interest” together in 
each class.  Section 22(2) sets out the factors that a debtor must consider when placing creditors 
into classes.  They are as follows: 
(a) the nature of the debts, liabilities or obligations giving rise to their 
claims; 
(b) the nature and rank of any security in respect of their claims; 
(c) the remedies available to the creditors in the absence of the 
compromise or arrangement being sanctioned, and the extent to which 
the creditors would recover their claims by exercising those remedies; 
and 
(d) any further criteria, consistent with those set out in paragraphs (a) to 
(c), that are prescribed.
301
 
 
The Red Cross Amended Plan of Compromise and Arrangement, set out the classification 
the Red Cross used to divide its claimants into classes for voting on the Plan.  It formed classes 
“based on the commonality of interest of such Creditors, such that Creditors with essentially 
similar rights against the Society and which are receiving essentially similar treatment have been 
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grouped together in the following classes for purposes of the Plan”.302  The creditors were 
divided into four classes: Class 1 - Ordinary Creditors; Class 2 - transfusion claimants; Class 3 - 
HIV claimants; and Class 4 - the Federal Provincial Territorial Government claims. 
 
3.8  The Plan 
Once a debtor receives protection from its creditors, it must create a plan of compromise or 
arrangement.  The debtor must attempt to form a plan that will be acceptable to the requisite 
portion of its creditors while at the same time keeping enough core assets to continue its business 
without going into bankruptcy for the benefit of the debtor, creditors, shareholders and everyone 
else who depends on the debtor continuing business. 
To begin the reorganization of the Red Cross, the Court had to deal with transferring the 
blood supply operations to a new authority but it wanted the proceeds from the transfer to be 
used to satisfy the transfusion claims, allowing the Red Cross to avoid bankruptcy and continue 
its humanitarian operations.  It is common for courts to approve the sale of assets during the 
reorganization process and prior to a Plan as this may be the only way to deal with all of a 
company’s creditors and allow the company to survive and re-establish itself.  This approach was 
adopted in Red Cross. 
The Court appointed representative counsel for the tort claimants.  The Red Cross entered 
into negotiations for two years with all of its creditors and on September 12, 2000, it applied for 
court approval of its Plan, which had already been approved by the majority of the classes of 
creditors.
303
 The Red Cross Plan included a number of class actions from Ontario, Quebec and 
British Columbia, and the negotiation of a broader settlement between the Federal, Provincial 
and Territorial (FPT) Governments and Transfusion Claimants infected between 1986 and 
1990.
304
 As a result of the FPT settlement, the funds from the transfer of the Canadian Blood 
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Supply to Canadian Blood Services and Héma Québec were primarily used by the Red Cross 
Plan to meet the claims of the pre-1986/post 1990 Transfusion Claimants, who were not 
permitted to participate in the Government Settlement.   
The class actions that were included in the Plan involved people who received blood 
containing the Hepatitis C virus and were infected pre-1986 and post-1990.  One of the class 
actions that was included was McCarthy v. Canadian Red Cross Society.
305
  This case deals with 
a class action that was commenced on March 10, 1998, after rumours that the federal, provincial 
and territorial governments were considering settling a class proceeding on behalf of people who 
contracted Hepatitis C between January 1, 1986 and July 1, 1990 without offering compensation 
to victims outside those timelines.
306
 The claimants in the McCarthy class action were infected 
with Hepatitis C by receiving blood or blood products prior to January 1, 1986 or after July 1, 
1990 but before September 28, 1998 in all provinces or territories of Canada except British 
Columbia and Quebec.
307
   This class action became part of the CCAA proceedings.  As the 
CCAA proceeding is national, courts having supervision of all class actions in British Columbia, 
Ontario and Quebec had to approve the settlement.   
The test a court will use to determine if a settlement in class proceedings will be approved 
is “whether or not the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interests of the class as a 
whole.”308  In class proceedings, the court attempts to protect absent class members’ interests, as 
class proceedings involve the issuance of orders or judgments that affect people who are not 
before the court. The Court certified the class action under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings 
Act.
309
  The Court found there was a cause of action, an identifiable class, common issues arising 
from the cause of action and the Court held that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure 
to deal with the common issues.  The class action was certified and the class was to receive a 
settlement through the CCAA trust.
310
 The settlement created a fund of approximately $63 
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million for people who were infected directly or indirectly with Hepatitis C as a result of blood 
received in Canada before 1986 or after July 1, 1990.   
A summary of the reorganization Plan is as follows: 
(a) Ordinary Creditors with proven claims not exceeding $10,000 will receive 100% of their 
proven claims; 
 
(b) Ordinary Creditors with proven claims of more than $10,000 will receive 67% of their 
proven claims; 
 
(c) A Trust is established for Transfusion Claimants, on specific terms described in the Plan, 
funded with $79 million plus interest already accrued under the Plan, as follows: 
(i) $600,000 for CJD claimants; 
(ii) $1 million for claimants in a class action alleging infection with Hepatitis C from 
blood obtained from prisons in the United States; 
(iii) $500,000 for claimants with other transfusion claims that are otherwise not 
provided for; 
(iv) Approximately $63 million for claimants in class actions alleging Hepatitis C 
infection before 1986 and after June 1990; and, 
(v) Approximately $13.7 million for settlement of HIV claims.311 
The Plan was funded not only from the funds received from the sale of the Blood assets, but also 
contributions from co-defendants and insurers.  The Plan sets out that the claimants were to 
apply to the Referee for a determination of the amount of their damages.   
 
 
People with CJD claims could apply to the CJD trust, which was to be maintained: 
until the earlier of 10 years following the Plan Implementation Date and 
the date on which the funds are exhausted.  During that period any Person 
proving a CJD Claim to the satisfaction of the Trustee shall be entitled to 
the sum of $10,000 from this fund, in exchange for delivering a full and 
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final release in favour of the Society and all Plan Participants and an 
undertaking not to pursue any other party in respect of such claims except 
on a several basis.....The surplus, if any, remaining in this fund after the 
expiry of the 10 year period shall be paid by the Trustee to the HCV 
fund.
312
  
 With respect to the Prison Blood HCV class, claimants had one year from the Plan 
Implementation date to prove to the trustee that they were members of that class. Members who 
qualified were entitled to an equal share of the fund to a maximum of $10,000 each.  Any surplus 
remaining after the expiry of the one (1) year period from the Plan Implementation Date were to 
be paid by the Trustee to the HCV Fund.
313
  
With respect to the HIV claims, the claimants had four months following the Plan 
Implementation Date for a determination of damages with respect to their respective HIV 
claim.
314
  It was left up to the Referee to decide whether limitation periods had expired prior to 
July 20, 1998, and if the Referee decided that the limitation period expired, no award or payment 
would be made to the claimant.  If the damage awards with respect to the HIV claims exceeded 
$10.0 million in the aggregate, payments to the claimants were to be reduced pro-rata so as to not 
exceed $10.0 million in the aggregate. Any surplus remaining after the disposition of all claims 
filed within the four month period following Plan Implementation Date were to be paid to the 
HCV fund. 
With respect to the Other Transfusion Claims, the Fund was to be held by the Trustee until 
the exhaustion of the fund and the expiry of ten years following Plan Implementation Date, for 
the benefit of people with Other Transfusion Claims.  A claimant in this category must have 
submitted a claim to the Trustee within ten years following the Plan Implementation Date and 
was entitled to receive a single payment from this fund in an amount not exceeding $10,000 until 
the fund was exhausted.  Any surplus remaining after ten years was to be paid by the Trustee to 
the HCV fund. 
The pre-86/post-90 HCV fund was to be distributed by the Trustee through a single trust 
account and be administered by a claims administrator designated by the courts hearing the Pre-
86/Post-90 HCV class actions in accordance with the Settlement Orders. A single national fund 
was created in order to provide equal payments to all members of such class actions (who do not 
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opt out) after deduction of any legal and administrative fees permitted by any order of the courts 
having jurisdiction in the Pre-86/Post-90 HCV Class Actions.   
The Plan established procedures under which claimants applied to a Referee
315
 for a 
determination of the amount of their damages.  The Red Cross Plan dealt with all people who 
were exposed to the blood pre-1986 and post-1990, which included future claimants as well as 
current claimants.  It channelled all the claims from people exposed during that period to the 
trust. 
 
3.9 Acceptance of Plan 
The debtor company, its creditors or the trustee have the right to file a plan and request that 
the court order a meeting of the creditors.
316
  A majority in number representing two-thirds in 
value of the creditors present and voting in person or by proxy must approve a plan of 
arrangement.
317
  The plan may be sanctioned by the Court and, if sanctioned, will bind all the 
creditors (or classes of creditors, where there is more than one class) that have accepted the plan 
and the company.  The court sets a “claim bar process” which prescribes the conditions for filing 
the claims and administering them, based on defined terms.  Under the order the monitor must 
send a proof of claim form with instructions to every creditor, requesting that it submit proof 
with sufficient evidence by a certain date, called a “claims bar date”.  If the agreement is 
approved by the creditors or altered or modified at the meetings, it will be sanctioned by the 
court and will be binding on all creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any 
trustee for that class.
318
  Once the creditors approve the plan of arrangement in each class, the 
debtor applies to the court for sanction of the plan.  The court will examine three general 
principles in exercising its discretion when approving the plan: (i) statutory requirements were 
strictly complied with; (ii) everything that was done was authorized by the CCAA; and (iii) the 
plan is fair and reasonable.  Although this test is not set out in the CCAA, it is used in general by 
the courts when deciding on whether they will accept a plan.
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The Red Cross obtained an Order Establishing claims procedure dated May 5, 1999, which 
stated that all “Transfusion Claims determined to be entitled to a vote shall, for the purposes of 
calculating approval under the CCAA, be valued at $1.00 per claim.”320  The order established a 
procedure whereby people with claims against the Society arising directly or indirectly of blood 
products supplied by the Red Cross could submit their claims to the Society as a precondition to 
voting on the Plan.  The Monitor sent out packages containing a Proof of Claim form to all 
known persons who were exposed to the blood products in the specified time.  There was a date 
set as to when they were due as well as instructions on how to complete the form.  Any 
transfusion claimants who had not submitted their forms were not entitled to vote in respect of 
their claim.  People who were not entitled to vote were still included in the Plan and eligible to 
receive a distribution if the Plan was approved. 
Justice Blair held that by applying all of the principles to the circumstances of Red Cross 
he had “no hesitation in concluding . . . that the Plan should be sanctioned and approved.”321  The 
court examined whether the Red Cross plan and reorganization process complied with all of the 
orders and statutory requirements.  As well, Justice Blair was satisfied that the Red Cross 
complied with the substance of all orders that were made.  With respect to whether the Plan was 
fair and reasonable, Justice Blair held that “the Plan is fair to all affected by it, and reasonable in 
the circumstances.  It balances the various competing interests in an equitable fashion.”322  He 
noted the complexities and difficulties involved in Red Cross proceedings and the scope of the 
negotiations through which these were addressed.  He explained that to “be ‘fair and reasonable’ 
a proposed Plan does not have to be perfect.  No Plan can be.  Plans are by nature and definition 
‘plans of compromise and arrangement’.  A Plan should be approved if it is inherently fair, 
inherently reasonable and inherently equitable”.323  Justice Blair stated that the Plan was 
overwhelmingly approved by the four classes of creditors.  He acknowledged that the 
Transfusion Claimants were not:  
the type of ‘business’ creditors normally affected by a CCAA 
arrangement, they are the ones most touched by the events leading up to 
these proceedings and by the elements of the Plan.  I see no reason why 
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their voting support of the Plan should not receive the same – or more – 
deference as that normally granted to creditors by the Court in these 
cases.  The fact that the Plan has received such a high level of support 
weighs very heavily in my consideration of approval.  The Plan is the 
result of negotiations amongst all interested parties – leading to changes 
and amendments which were made and approved as late as the August 
30
th
 meetings.  The various groups were all represented by legal and 
professional advisors, including the Transfusion Claimants who were 
advised and represented by Representative Counsel.”324  
 In accepting the Plan, Justice Blair stated that it equitably balanced the various competing 
interests and the available resources of the Red Cross.  He stated:  “the evidence is that creditors 
— including the Transfusion Claimants — would not receive a better distribution in the event of 
liquidation of all of the assets of the Society.”325  No one opposed the sanctioning of the Plan; in 
fact, most supported it.  As well Justice Blair noted that the Monitor strongly recommended the 
Plan and its approval.  Justice Blair explained the situation of the Red Cross and its need to 
implement a Plan as follows: 
[I]t is significant, in my view, that the Plan if implemented will permit 
the Canadian Red Cross to continue to carry on its non-blood related 
humanitarian activities.  There is a deep-seated anger and bitterness 
towards the Society amongst many of the victims of these terrible blood 
diseases.  To them, it is not right that thousands of people have been 
poisoned by tainted blood yet the Society is able to continue on with the 
other facets of its business.  These feelings are understandable.  However, 
the Red Cross currently continues to employ approximately 7,000 
Canadians in the other aspects of its work, and it makes valuable 
contributions to society through these humanitarian efforts.  That it will 
be able to continue those works, if the Plan is implemented, is 
important.
326
 
The Plan stated that it will bind all creditors affected by the Plan.
327
  As well the Red Cross asked 
the Courts of each province to give recognition and assistance to the sanction order and to the 
implementation of the Plan.  In the end, all of the people who had claims against the Red Cross 
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because of tainted blood products they received during the pre-1989, post-1990 period, could 
only turn to the Plan and its trusts for compensation. The Red Cross plan extinguished or 
converted and “channelled” claims to the HIV fund.  Justice Cullity stated that the rights of the 
HIV Claimants “were, in effect, converted into, or replaced by, rights to receive damages from 
the HIV Fund”.328 
 
3.10 Outcome of the Red Cross Reorganization 
Unfortunately the first distributions from the HIV trust did not begin until October, 2010.   
The final distribution was approved in April, 2012 and as of August, 2012 the distribution was 
completed, fourteen years after the Red Cross reorganization began.
329
 After the Plan was 
implemented, many motions were made to the court, primarily with respect to how the Plan was 
to be interpreted and who should be deemed eligible to receive compensation.  Over twenty 
hearings and appeals occurred from June of 2002 until March of 2007.  One of the issues that 
were dealt with included what law would apply to the Plan, in the end it was determined that 
Ontario law would apply.  Another issue that arose was the need to determine which claimants 
had signed releases prior to the implementation of the Plan and therefore were not eligible to 
make a claim against the HIV fund.  There were also various proceedings in order to determine 
how limitation periods would be calculated.
330
 In September 2008, the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, dealt with an application requesting a late claim be allowed into the class.
331
  In this case, 
the number of HIV claimants had been underestimated and the trustee was asking whether the 
court had jurisdiction to extend the deadline or direct that additional late, or irregular 
applications, should be accepted.   Justice Cullity stated that: 
[i]t is tragic that a plan designed to provide compensation for innocent 
victims should be tied up in disputes over whether all, or only some of 
them, are to receive it – disputes that many and, perhaps, most of the 
eligible HIV Claimants must find mystifying, and disheartening.  Much 
of the impetus for the litigation has stemmed from an initial 
misapprehension that the number of the potential Claimants was 
significantly less than has since appeared to be the case.
332
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The HIV claimants had until February 5, 2002, four months after the Plan Implementation Date, 
to file a claim.  Eighty-nine infected people made timely applications, but thirty-eight did not. 
Some failed to file claims because of inadequate notice of the HIV fund, others due to 
misunderstanding of the language of the application and others who did not know that were 
infected with HIV until after the deadline. The Trustee believed more late claims may arise in the 
future. Article 5.10 of the Plan extinguished late HIV claims.  After the four-month period for 
filing a claim, any surplus was to be paid to the HCV fund, ignoring any late HIV claims.  The 
Trustee asked the court whether he had jurisdiction to extend or relieve against the effect of the 
deadline. There were a number of problems with the HIV trust.  Initially, the estimate of the 
amount of funds that would be required for the fund was too low and had been depleted by 
administration and litigation costs.  The number of claimants was also underestimated, and for 
many people, the latency period for discovering they were infected was not until after the 
deadline for applications.
333
  In the end Justice Cullity allowed late claims to be filed.  He based 
his decision on a number of factors, one of which was: 
the HIV Claimants are very different to those of commercial creditors 
affected by CCAA proceedings. While, as a general rule, the latter can be 
presumed to be knowledgeable, and ready and willing to assert their 
claims, the same cannot be said of the HIV Claimants who did not 
personally retain lawyers and did not participate in the CCAA 
proceeding. This was, I believe, reflected in the bar order that 
disqualified them from voting but did not purport to bar their Claims. 
Some, and perhaps most of them, prepared applications without 
professional assistance.
334
   
 
Justice Cullity allowed late claims with the following reasons: 
(a) the structure of the Plan with its provision of a separate Fund for HIV 
Claimants; 
(b) the fact that no distributions from the HIV Fund have yet been made; 
(c) the absence of prejudice that would be suffered by the Society and 
other Claimants; 
(d) the uncertainty created by the limitations issues; 
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(e) the circumstances of the Claimants that distinguish them from 
commercial creditors; 
 
(f) the fact that adequate notice to them was essential if the Plan was to 
be effective; 
(g) the application forms provided to Claimants did not clearly indicate 
that they were required to identify each Claimant in a family group that 
included an infected person. Similarly, I am of the opinion that it was not 
unreasonable for a Claimant who had filed a Proof of Claim to 
understand that this would be considered to be a claim against the HIV 
Fund to which the deadline was said to apply in the notice provided by 
the Trustee; and 
(h) the selection of appropriate methods of disseminating notice of the 
deadline for applications may have been affected, and unduly limited, by 
the misapprehension as to the number of potential Claimants. It appears, 
also, that, as in the case of those in Nova Scotia, the chosen method may 
not have been completely successful in reaching Claimants whose 
identities were ascertainable. 
Justice Cullity only allowed claims from claimants who did not receive proper notice.  If they 
had received proper notice they would have a valid claim as of the bar date.  He did not allow 
late claims from those whose injuries were discovered after the bar date.  His reasoning was as 
follows: 
Cases where a Claimant was not diagnosed with HIV until after the 
deadline are more difficult. The jurisdiction to relieve against untimely 
applications is, in my opinion, limited to applications by persons who 
could have established their eligibility within the four months period. It 
would not apply to persons whose infection was not discovered before 
the expiration of the period. The intention to withhold damages from 
such persons is inherent in the imposition of the deadline and is not 
affected by deficiencies in, and the imperfection of, notice dissemination 
that, in a case such as this and in class proceedings, underlie the 
jurisdiction to relieve against untimely applications. The necessity for 
some cut-off date in respect of the time of a diagnosis is reinforced by the 
likelihood that the HIV Fund will prove to be inadequate to satisfy all of 
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the qualified HIV Claimants, with the result that distributions might need 
to be deferred until the maximum number of Claimants was ascertained. 
In my judgment, it is one thing to grant relief to persons who might have 
— but, for some reason, did not — claim within the four months' period 
and something fundamentally different to extend the class to persons who 
would not have been able to establish a claim within the period. The 
exclusion of the latter should, in my opinion, be considered to be part of 
the compromise effected by the Plan, and to that extent its provisions are 
to be respected.
335
 
 
The OTC fund consisted of $500,000 which was to expire at the end of ten years or if it 
there was surplus it was to go to the HCV fund.  The ten years was to expire on October 5, 2011 
and by then only two claims had been made against the trust and paid out.  General notice of the 
existence of the fund was not given to potential claimants.  In Re Canadian Red Cross
336
 the 
Trustee moved for an order amending the Plan to extend the expiry date for the OTC fund by one 
year, in order to provide proper notice of the existence of the fund and administer and disburse 
eligible claims.  The Monitor’s proof of claim form contained an “other” box when claimants 
were filing their claim and describing the nature of it.  The Trustee did not know about the 
“other” box until 2011. Two hundred and thirteen people filed proof of claim forms that had 
marked the “other” box.  The Trustee applied to the Court to be able to give notice to those who 
checked the “other” box of the existence of the OTC fund.  The Court extended the expiration 
date by one year to October 5, 2012.  Justice Brown stated that:   
In the present circumstances I am persuaded that a one-year extension of 
the expiration date of the OTC Fund is necessary in order to give effect to 
the intention of the Plan regarding claimants asserting Other Transfusion 
Claims.  Not to extend the time would impair the effectiveness of the 
OTC Fund and deny access to that fund to eligible claimants who, 
through no fault of their own, had no knowledge about the existence of 
the fund.  I see no prejudice to other groups of claimants where an 
extension would simply bring the existence of the OTC Fund to the 
attention of those whom the fund was intended to benefit.
337
   
Consequently, in Canadian Red Cross,
338
  Justice Brown had to deal with the HCV Fund 
because when he extended the OTC Trust by one year it affected the HCV Fund as any 
                                                 
335
 Canadian Red Cross Society, 2008 CarswellOnt 6105 at para 40, 48 C.B.R. (5
th
) 41 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
336
 2011 CarswellOnt 6036, 79 C.B.R. (5th) 258 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
337
 Supra note 335 at para 15. 
338
 Re Canadian Red Cross 2011 CarswellOnt 9017, 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 7 (Ont.S.C.J.). 
 
87 
 
remaining funds were to go to the HCV Fund and be distributed.  A number of HCV Fund claims 
have been completed and paid.  There have been at least two reminders sent out to people who 
have sent in incomplete claims.  The Trustee applied to set an express bar date to ensure the 
orderly final administration of the HCV Fund.  The claims bar date was set for October 5, 2011.  
There was evidence that 574 accepted claims against the HCV Fund had yet to be paid as there is 
no money left in the Fund.  There will be money also coming in from the CJD Fund and Prison 
Blood Fund.  The claimants have been waiting five years for payment.  The bar date was set in 
order to permit the distribution of funds to the waiting accepted claims.  As a number of 
reminder letters were sent to claimants with incomplete applications, the Court determined the 
bar date was fair.  As of the writing of this thesis, the HCV fund and OTC fund are in the final 
stages of being completed. Unfortunately, the trusts in the Red Cross case were plagued with 
problems that included lack of proper notice, clarity of how to determine limitation periods and 
poor estimation of the number and amount of the claims.   
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CHAPTER 4:  CONCLUSION 
All mass tort cases have similar features.  They all involve a large number of claims that 
are associated with one product, the various claims have common issues and actors and the value 
of the claims are interdependent.  As well, mass torts are further complicated by a temporal 
problem as exposure to the product may be years before a disease develops and a geographically 
claimants may be dispersed across a country or throughout many parts of world.
339
 Although the 
CCAA and Bankruptcy Code were not enacted specifically to deal with mass tort claims, they 
provide an organized forum where all the issues that arise in a mass tort case can be dealt with. 
Canada treats mass tort insolvency cases very similar to the United States, even though the 
Bankruptcy Code and the CCAA are very different. 
In the United States insolvency is not a requirement; to receive protection in Canada it is, 
but a company defending thousands of tort claims can receive CCAA protection if it is 
experiencing extreme financial distress at the time of its application. The stay order in both 
countries provides the debtor company with the opportunity to halt all proceedings against it in 
order to reorganize and restructure without any interference from creditors or other interested 
parties.  This is important to companies facing mass tort claims as the number of people seeking 
damages is constantly changing. Similar to the U. S. Trustee
340
, in Canada a monitor is appointed 
to watch over the business and financial affairs of the company and report to the court on the 
debtor’s financial affairs.  The monitor can be given other functions a court orders including 
assisting a debtor to develop a plan.
341
   In the United States a trustee takes on this role.   
The biggest hurdle for companies in both countries is how the various tort claims fit into 
the insolvency legislation.  The Bankruptcy Code and the CCAA both contain very broad 
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definitions of “claim”.  The easiest and most straightforward tort claims in reorganizations are 
claims represented by judgments.  In the United States and Canada, these types of claims are 
included in the insolvency case as the claims and the damages they are claiming are represented 
by judgments. The second types of claims that may arise in a mass tort insolvency case are those 
of claimants that have filed suit but have not obtained judgment as of the petition date.  These 
claims are considered unliquidated claims as the amount of their damages has yet to be 
determined.
342
  The United States and Canada include these claims in the insolvency case.  In the 
United States, the bankruptcy court can estimate the amount of the claim to confirm a plan. In 
Canada, the monitor and the company will determine if an unliquidated claim is provable and 
will thereafter value it.  Canada includes claims where a judgment exists but the damages have 
not been determined by a court and where a claim has started but the trial has not commenced.   
The third type of “claim” is one where the injuries have manifested but in which the 
claimants have yet to file suit.  As long as the injuries have manifested, these claims will be 
included in a bankruptcy case under the Bankruptcy Code because of the broad wording in 
section 101(5) and section 157(b)(5,) which deal with procedures that allow the district court to 
order personal injury tort and wrongful death claims to be tried by the district court.  Similarly in 
the Canadian system, section 2 of the CCAA uses the word obligation which is a broad term that 
allows for the inclusion of these claims.  The first three types of tort claims all include people 
whose injuries have manifest prior to the debtor applying to the CCAA for protection.  These 
claims are not too different from many of the commercial claimants that companies face in most 
CCAA proceedings.  
Contingent and future tort claimants hold claims where the people have been exposed to 
the debtor’s product but their injuries have not manifested.  In the case of contingent claims, the 
claimants are known, but their injuries are not, whereas for future claimants, the claimants and 
the injuries are unknown.  While both the United States and Canada have dealt with these claims 
as one under the heading future claims, there is a difference as there is less error in determining 
only the extent of possible injuries rather than the number of people and their injuries. As well, 
contingent claimants can take part in the reorganization, not by voting but by having a 
representative who is representing their interests and can oversee the representative to ensure 
their interests are properly represented.  As future claimants are unknown, their representative 
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does not receive input from the claimants. This is the most complex issue in mass tort insolvency 
reorganizations and provides most of the errors, as estimation values can be inaccurate.  In the 
United States, some courts allow these types of claims to be included in the bankruptcy plan 
while others do not.  The courts that have not allowed future claims to be included focused on 
state law, which holds that a tort claim does not arise until the plaintiff suffers injury.  Most of 
the courts have held that the Bankruptcy Code contains provisions to accelerate the maturity of 
any contingent or unliquidated claims and allow for the estimation and classification of them.  
The cases that have included future claims have done so by setting up a trust fund for the future 
claimants to turn to when their claims arise.  An estimation is provided to determine how much 
money should be put aside for these claimants, and as well, a representative is appointed to 
represent these claimants’ interests.  Cases such as Johns- Manville, Dow Corning and A.H. 
Robins have all included future claims by creating trusts in their plan.  The problem with all of 
these cases is that they then must deal with long tails, as it can take more than a decade to pay 
out all of the claimants. Still, in the end the debtors have paid out most of their claimants and 
have continued to run their businesses.   
In Canada, the CCAA does not specifically provide that future claims are to be included in 
the bankruptcy plan.  However, the definition of “claim” in section 2(1) of the CCAA refers to 
“liability”, which is defined as all obligations a bankrupt is subject to on the day proceedings 
commence.    This allows claims from people who have been exposed to the debtor’s product 
pre-petition but have yet to manifest injuries.  Claims that have yet to manifest themselves are 
not provable, but the courts have found a way around this as in the Red Cross case and 
Muscletech. While the language in the CCAA is broad enough to include future claims the 
problem is a plan must deal with the claims in order for them to be included in the 
reorganization.  For known claimants, showing exposure to a product would constitute a 
provable claim, but in order to receive a distribution, the claimant must prove the damages.  That 
can only be provided when the injury manifests itself.  For classic future claimants, they do not 
have a claim in the CCAA, as exposure or injury is not provable.  The Red Cross and Muscletech 
cases circumvented this issue by setting up trusts.  The courts have used their judicial discretion 
in section 11 to set up these trusts and funnel all of the tort claims towards the trust.  Therefore, 
this allows courts dealing with mass torts to fulfill the intent of the CCAA by providing a global 
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resolution for all of the debtor’s pre-filing debts and provide it with a clean slate to continue 
business.   
Another set of claims that a mass tort insolvency case may encounter is claimants that were 
exposed post-petition but pre-confirmation.  In the United States, these claims to be included in 
the bankruptcy case under “administrative expenses”.  In Canada, if a person is exposed to a 
product post-petition, their claim is not included in the reorganization.  Therefore, in the United 
States, all pre-confirmation claims are included in the reorganization, whereas in Canada, only 
those that were exposed pre-petition are included.  Neither Canada nor the United States allow 
claims when a person is exposed to the debtor’s product post-confirmation. Once the types of 
claims that will be included in the case are determined, the claims are divided into classes.  In 
both countries, creditors whose rights or interests are sufficiently similar are placed in the same 
class.  In most mass tort cases, the tort claimants are grouped together as one class or separated 
as in the Red Cross by the type of disease they contracted. 
Once the classes are created, the debtor then develops a plan.  This allows companies to 
customize plan to deal with the particular issues they are facing.  This gives companies dealing 
with mass tort claims the ability to deal with unmanifested claims.  Section 1123(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code outlines the mandatory provisions that the plan must contain and section 
1123(b) sets out optional provisions.  The requirements are very broad, allowing companies to 
customize plans to the issues and claims they are faced with.  The types of plans vary for each 
case as each situation is unique.  The Johns Manville case set up trusts to deal with all tort claims 
as well as its commercial claimants in order to achieve a global resolution.  The trust dealt with 
current as well as future tort claims and channelled all asbestos related personal injury claims to 
the trust and the plan set out procedures on how the claimants were to apply and receive 
compensation.  The A.H. Robins case developed a Claims Resolution Facility and set up payment 
schedules based on the severity of injury the claimant received and the quality of proof.  If the 
injury was not severe or proof linking the injury to the debtor’s product was weak, the claimant 
could opt for a quick payment scheme that provided a set amount of compensation, but was 
much lower than that for people with severe injuries and strong proof.  If a claimant’s injuries 
were more severe and there was medical evidence directly linking the injury to the use of the 
Dalkon Shield, each claim would be individually examined and the compensation offered ranged 
between $125 and $2 million.  If the claimant did not accept the settlement he or she could opt to 
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go to binding arbitration or to trial. Dow Corning was very similar to A.H. Robins in that it set up 
a Settlement Trust that channelled all of the tort claims to a settlement facility and set out a 
payment schedule from expedited payments (fewer injuries or lack of proof) to the most severe 
and strong proof.  Both A.H. Robins and the Dow Corning cases provided for more expedited 
payment schemes and used fewer expenses as they avoided a lot of litigation.   
In Canada, the CCAA does not set out specific requirements that the compromise or 
arrangement must include.  It is left to the parties to determine what and how the compromise 
will be set up.  Red Cross developed a detailed plan of arrangement that was very similar to that 
of Johns Manville. Red Cross set up a number of classes of tort claimants, based on the type of 
injury they received (i.e. HIV, CJD).  The claimants, both present and future, were to apply to 
these trusts for compensation, and a Referee was to determine the amount of damages each 
claimant was to receive.  This allowed the Red Cross to deal with as many claims as possible. 
Once a plan is prepared it must be accepted by all of the classes of creditors and then the 
court will sanction it.  Then the court will confirm the plan, as long as certain requirements 
which look after the claimants as well as debtor’s interests are present in the plan.  The court will 
sanction a plan and determine if the statutory requirements were strictly complied with, nothing 
was been done that the CCAA does not authorize and the plan is fair and reasonable.  In both 
countries, tort claimants who had filed claims voted on the plan.  Future claimant’s interests were 
represented by counsel who was appointed by the courts.  The representative counsel examined 
the plan and determined if the plan was fair for future claimants and therefore future claimants 
were bound by the plan. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code is much more detailed than the CCAA, mass tort cases are 
treated similarly under both Acts.  Neither Act specifically deals with mass tort issues, but the 
courts and parties involved have found both pieces of legislation broad enough to include mass 
tort issues.  In the end, as many claims as possible are included under both reorganizational 
schemes and have the room to include future claims.  The plans that are developed provide the 
debtor with a clean slate and the ability to continue doing business while compensating the many 
victims.  Although neither the United States nor Canada have found a perfect solution to mass 
tort claims in bankruptcy, they have managed to find a way to provide a global solution to the 
mass tort problems and assist companies in avoiding liquidation.  The importance of finding 
ways to avoid liquidation was very evident in the Red Cross case. The Red Cross needed to 
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continue its humanitarian operations and also deal with the tort claimants.  The ability of the 
CCAA to provide compensation to those people the Red Cross injured while continuing to help 
those in need of its services, fulfills the goals of the CCAA. The Red Cross is an example of how 
mass tort cases can be dealt within the framework of the CCAA.   
Although mass tort cases can be dealt with in the CCAA, there are still a number of 
problems with dealing with mass torts in commercial law.  The Red Cross settlement turned out 
to be very similar to the Johns Manville case in that it was plagued with problems and a decade 
later many claimants have yet to be compensated.  Many mistakes were made when preparing 
the Plan, namely estimating the number of claimants and the latency of certain diseases, 
specifically the HIV claims and failing to provide specific information on how limitation periods 
would be calculated.  In 2008, the Court dealt with extending the deadline for one more year to 
allow HIV claimants that were unable to establish their eligibility within the four-month period 
because of notice deficiencies.  People who developed HIV after the four-month period were 
excluded from applying.  It was assumed that all people who had contracted HIV had manifested 
injuries and therefore people with HIV claims were given four months after the a mass tort 
insolvency cases to submit claims.  Because of this error many tort claimants were excluded 
from receiving compensation. 
While fully addressing the problems relating to future claims is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, many issues have been exposed.  The Red Cross and the Johns Manville cases are 
examples that have shown the most challenging area of dealing with tort claims in mass tort 
insolvency is which is finding a way to properly estimate latent claims in both countries.  As 
Justice Blair stated in the Red Cross reorganization mass tort insolvency cases deal with much 
more than commercial issues, “[m]any have died.  Others are dying.  The rest live in the shadow 
of death. Nothing the Court can do will take away these diseases or bring back to life those who 
have died.”343  The CCAA and the Bankruptcy Code are the only forums where companies can 
attempt to achieve global resolutions while continuing to provide compensation to future 
claimants.  The tragedy in these cases occurs when, as in the Red Cross case, the companies 
underestimate the number of potential claimants, the extent of their injuries and the amount of 
time the injury will take to manifest itself.  These errors not only affect the future claimants but 
also the present ones.   This is what occurred in the Red Cross; claimants were waiting over a 
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decade to receive compensation and the amount of compensation continually decreased as the 
trust was depleted by administrative costs and an increasing number of claims.  The Dow 
Corning and A.H. Robins cases were more successful because the injuries their products caused 
did not have a long latency period, and the claimants were primarily contingent. Those dealing 
with unknown tort claimants and long latency periods are left with the question of how to 
successfully deal with mass torts in bankruptcy.   
It is impossible to prove that an injury was caused by the debtor’s product if it does not 
manifest itself until after the bar date.
344
  That is why the mass tort insolvency cases have turned 
to trusts.  The problem with trusts arises when people who have not received serious harm claim 
they have injuries, therefore wasting a company’s time and money in order to defend these types 
of claims.  As well, companies who incorrectly estimate the amount required to place into trusts 
for future claimants cause people to accept plans based on the belief that they will receive a 
greater amount then they actually do because of poor estimation values.  In the United States, 
Dow Corning and A.H. Robins had more “successful” restructurings by creating plans where the 
amount of compensation an injured person was to receive was based on the amount of evidence 
they had which proved causation and the extent of their injuries.  They set up various trust funds 
not based on the type of injury but based on the evidence they had.  The smallest fund was set up 
for those with little evidence or evidence that was not strong and with little or no injury.  These 
claimants received the smallest amount of damages and also used up the least amount of funds, 
as very little administrative costs were required to deal with these claims.  The second trust was 
larger than the first, requiring more evidence of causation but provided for a quick and 
predetermined payment of compensation. For people with severe injuries and strong proof of 
causation, they could apply under the third trust, which was the largest one, and where a trial 
would be held to prove their claim and they received the highest amount of compensation 
(traditional tort).
345
  This helped speed up the compensation process and decrease the amount of 
money that was being used by administrative costs.  Both of these cases did not contain injuries 
with very long tails.  Had the Red Cross provided for longer bar dates the issue may have been 
avoided and if they followed a trust scheme, as in Dow Corning and A.H. Robins where it was a 
“best offer no negotiation” (which decreased administrative costs), the trust funds may not have 
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been depleted. The Red Cross could have done what Johns-Manville did and overhaul the Plan to 
include claimants that were inadvertently excluded or find some other funding to create a trust 
for the latent claims. 
It has been argued by Vern DaRe in his article “Risks Inherent in the Settlement of Tort 
Claims: Recent Direction from the Red Cross Case”, that in cases such as the Red Cross:  
compensation may be seen as a public obligation.  While the “deep 
pockets” of government are not limitless, restructuring debtors with 
broader-based public operations are grounded on a wider notion of 
community responsibility.  Arguably Red Cross had a broader duty to the 
public including the duty to compensate ineligible HIV claimants who 
were “forever barred” simply because of long latency periods.  Where the 
debtor under the CCAA has a public mandate, therefore, mass tort 
claimants may in the future want to be more aggressive in picking these 
“deep pockets” to avoid this risk.346   
As well as government, there are usually insurance companies and many other companies 
involved with the reorganizing company that may be turned to for increasing the amount of 
funds available to compensate victims.  Additionally, another option may be to create trusts into 
which money is added as more claims arise.  
The other option is to codify the treatment of mass torts by adding a definition of mass 
torts into the CCAA and providing for mass tort representatives.   The United States Bankruptcy 
Reform Commission has recommended that changes be made to the Bankruptcy Code to include 
mass tort claims to guide the structured treatment of mass future claims in the bankruptcy 
system.
347
 These recommendations would greatly assist the CCAA in dealing with mass tort 
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Definition of Mass Future Claim  
A definition of "mass future claim" should be added as a subset of the definition of "claim" in 
11 U.S.C. § 101(5). "Mass future claim" should be defined as a claim arising out of a right to 
payment, or equitable relief that gives rise to a right to payment that has or has not accrued under 
nonbankruptcy law that is created by one or more acts or omissions of the debtor if:  
1) the act(s) or omission(s) occurred before or at the time of the order for relief; 
2) the act(s) or omission(s) may be sufficient to establish liability when injuries ultimately 
are manifested;  
3) at the time of the petition, the debtor has been subject to numerous demands for payment 
for injuries or damages arising from such acts or omissions and is likely to be subject to 
substantial future demands for payment on similar grounds;  
4) the holders of such rights to payments are known or, if unknown, can be identified or 
described with reasonable certainty; and  
5) the amount of such liability is reasonably capable of estimation.  
The definition of "claim" in section 101(5) should be amended to add a definition of "holder 
of a mass future claim," which would be an entity that holds a mass future claim.  
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claims and could easily be added to the legislation. The Commission’s recommendations include 
a definition of mass future claim “as arising out of a right to payment, or equitable relief that 
gives right to payment that has or has not accrued under nonbankruptcy law that is created by 
one or more acts or omissions of the debtor…”  As well the Commission recommends that mass 
future claims representatives shall be appointed and have the ability to file claims, cast votes on 
behalf of the holders of the claims.  It also states that mass future claims should be estimated and 
that there should be a section providing for a channelling injunction. In order to close the 
bankruptcy case, the Commission recommends that when the plan has fulfilled the requirements 
for treating mass future claims that the company be discharged.  To date the United States has 
not added mass torts into its Bankruptcy Code and Canada has not attempted to include mass 
torts either. Providing more sections that deal with mass torts would assist in a more uniform 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Protecting the Interests of Holders of Mass Future Claims  
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a party in interest may petition the court for the 
appointment of a mass future claims representative. When a plan includes a class or classes of mass 
future claims, the Bankruptcy Code should authorize a court to order the appointment of a 
representative for each class of holders of mass future claims. A mass future claims representative 
shall serve until further order of the bankruptcy court.  
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims representative shall have the 
exclusive power to file a claim or claims on behalf of the class of mass future claims (and to determine 
whether or not to file a claim), to cast votes on behalf of the holders of mass future claims and to 
exercise all of the powers of a committee appointed pursuant to section 1102. However, a holder of a 
mass future claim may elect to represent his, her, or its own interests and may opt out of being 
represented by the mass future claims representative.  
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization, the 
fees and expenses of a mass future claims representative and his or her agents shall be administrative 
expenses under section 503. Following the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, and for so long as 
holders of mass future claims may exist, any continuing fees and expenses of a mass future claims 
representative and his or her agents shall be an expense of the fund established for the compensation 
of mass future claims.  
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims representative shall serve until 
further orders of the bankruptcy court declare otherwise, shall serve as a fiduciary for the holders of 
future claims in such representative's class, and shall be subject to suit only in the district where the 
representative was appointed. Determination of Mass Future Claims  
Section 502 should provide that the court may estimate mass future claims and also may 
determine the amount of mass future claims prior to confirmation of a plan for purposes of distribution 
as well as allowance and voting. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) should specify that core 
proceedings include the estimation or determination of the amount of mass future claims.  
Channeling Injunctions  
Section 524 should authorize courts to issue channeling injunctions.  
 Plan Confirmation and Discharge; Successor Liability  
Sections 363 and 1123 should provide that the trustee may dispose of property free and clear of mass future 
claims when the trustee or plan proponent has satisfied the requirements for treating mass future claims. Upon 
approving the sale, the court could issue, and later enforce, an injunction to preclude holders from suing a 
successor/good faith purchaser. 
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inclusion of future mass tort claims in reorganizations.  Mass tort insolvency will only become 
more common as the global marketplace is every increasing. 
A large problem in mass tort insolvency cases are the underestimation of future claims.   
Finding better estimation techniques or creating trust funds where a company would have to 
funnel money into over a longer period of time may be an option in successfully dealing with 
latent claims.  Some may argue that it would be better for a company to be liquidated, and in 
some way punished for what the company’s negligence did to the tort claimants, but in most 
cases it is beneficial for the tort claimants to have a company reorganize.  This is because they 
can refuse to accept a plan that does not offer them more compensation than they would receive 
if the company was liquidated.  As well, future claimants would not be able to receive any 
compensation if a company was dissolved.  Ultimately though, the Bankruptcy Code and the 
CCAA provide a forum for companies and creditors to reach a global resolution to all of the 
issues that arise in mass tort insolvency cases while including future mass tort claimants. 
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